


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# ***JPRS Report***



# **Soviet Union**

## ***Military Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Military Affairs

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19 November 1990

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## Latvia Suspends Soviet Servicemen's Registration

### Latvian Supreme Soviet Resolution

90SV0046A SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
11 Aug 90 p 1

[Resolution of the Latvian Supreme Soviet of 4 Aug 90]

[Text] Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic suspending USSR Council of Ministers Order No. 1943r of 2 November 1989 "Registration of Servicemen on Extended-Duty Active Service According to the Disposition of the Military Units" on the territory of the Latvian Republic.

The Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic decrees:

USSR Council of Ministers Order No. 1943r of 2 Nov 89 "Registration of Servicemen on Extended-Duty Active Service According to the Location Where Military Units are Stationed" is suspended on the territory of the Latvian Republic on the basis of Article 97 of the Constitution of the Latvian SSR.

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic

A. Gorbunov;

Secretary of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic

I. Daudish.

Riga, 4 Aug 90.

### Ryzhkov Order

90SV0046B SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
11 Aug 90 p 1

[Instruction No. 1943r of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.]

[Text] USSR Council of Ministers Order No. 1943r of 2 Nov 89. Moscow, Kremlin.

The proposal of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, as coordinated with the USSR Ministry of Justice, on the registration of servicemen, warrant officers and officers (and their family members) on extended-duty active service of the armed forces of the USSR, the border, internal-service and railroad troops, as well as organs of the USSR KGB, according to the place where the military unit is stationed for the time until the receipt of living space under established procedure is adopted as an exception.

USSR Council of Ministers Chairman  
N. Ryzhkov.

### Discussion of Rights of Servicemen

90SV0046C SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
11 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by republic people's deputies G. Morozli and V. Smirnov: "Do Servicemen Have Rights?"]

[Text] Deputy Yu. Boyaris was in a hurry. The last day of work of the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the republic. The parliament was going on holiday—have to

hurry! Hurry to deprive those servicemen and their family members without housing and not registered under the military units of the right to registration. In practical, everyday terms, this meant to deprive them of the right to obtain a visitor's card, coupons for food-stuffs, the right to drive, and for the families, the right to get jobs, to visit clinics, to place their children in nursery school, kindergartens and even in school! It is really hardly possible to list all of the large and small rights that registration gives us today.

Quite a simple scenario was conceived. They evidently recalled the recent military picketers in front of the Supreme Soviet building and the demands of the officers in the Riga garrison that were posed to the 15th session of the last convocation of the parliament when developing it. They also recalled how this had troubled public opinion at the time—what will happen if the officers come out into the streets to protect their rights? It was naturally impossible to permit such a worsening of the situation next time. Everything was thus done "very modestly."

Several demonstrators with antiwar demands had formed up at the building of the Riga City Council the night before. The ideas on their placards were not distinguished by any novelty: "Communals for us, apartments for soldiers," "The motherland is calling you..." etc. It was hot on August 3, and they were thus not standing there for long. The main event was planned for the next day.

Roughly an hour before the conclusion of the session, before the chairman of the Supreme Soviet wished all of the parliamentarians a good vacation, a draft decree was making the rounds among their ranks. All the deputies were hardly able to read this document closely, global in content and brief in form. The author of the draft also unfortunately could not be ascertained. True, it became clear that not one of the deputies of the commissions had discussed it ahead of time. Was all of that really important if the long-awaited vacation after an exhausting session had almost arrived?

The information of Deputy Yu. Boyaris on the draft took less than five minutes. It was basically done because of the fact that echelons of servicemen restationed from Eastern Europe had supposedly arrived in Talsinskiy Rayon. What was the reliability of the information? None whatsoever. The main thing was the opinion of the deputy, which, figuratively expressed, was that a host of "occupiers" had arrived. That being so, it was necessary to deprive them of the most natural civil rights immediately. And along with them the ones that were already serving in the republic as well but had been unable to register, the ones who had gone to reserve locations or been transferred on official business, those who had completed the military academy or had decided to become warrant officers. Hundreds and thousands of already difficult soldiers' fates... True, Mr. Boyaris did not mention them, probably did not even think of them. There was no time.

They were able to ask two questions on the subject. Another two spoke—a deputy's inquiry and on the motives of the voting. The approach prevailed that questions and speeches were not needed.

There was catastrophically little time for the majority. The majority voted amicably and unanimously. A hundred and one votes "in favor." A splash of approval—the resolution is adopted. It was added for correctness that the decree took effect from the moment of adoption.

They were in such a hurry that they evidently did not see that the typist put into the draft decree not all categories of individuals mentioned in the USSR Council of Ministers order being halted on the territory of Latvia, but only extended-duty servicemen, while warrant officers and officers (and their family members) were forgotten (!). But that is how it was adopted. What can you do? The majority were in a hurry. They were afraid of being late... for vacation.

#### Jurist's Commentary

90SV0046D SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
11 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by Colonel of Justice V. Falaleyev, acting military procurator of the Baltic Military District, entitled: 'Jurist's Commentary'.]

[Text] **The Resolution of 4 August 1990 of the Latvian Supreme "On the suspension of USSR Council of Ministers Order No. 1943r of 2 Nov 89 'Registration of Servicemen on Extended-Duty Active Service According to the Location Where Military Units are Stationed' on the territory of the Latvian Point 5 of Article 97 of the Constitution of the Latvian SSR in force on the territory of Latvia.**

**This point of the constitutional article indicated relates to the exclusive authority of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic to halt the execution of acts by bodies of state administration on the territory of Latvia in the event they do not conform to the Constitution and the laws of the republic.**

**USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Order No. 1943r of 2 Nov 89, concerning permission for the registration of extended-duty servicemen, warrant officers and officers (and family members) of the armed forces of the USSR, the border, internal-service and railroad troops, as well as the organs of the USSR KGB, according to the disposition of the military units, until they receive living space under established procedure, does not contradict the Constitution and the laws of the Republic, and thus the suspension of the effect of this order on its territory encroaches on the rights of these citizens and is contrary to law.**

V. Falaleyev

Acting military procurator of the Baltic Military District.

#### Figures on Servicemen Leaving CPSU

90SV0039A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
6 Sep 90 First Edition p 4

[Question from Lt Col (Res) M. Grigorenko and answer by Maj Gen A. Gorbachev: "Only to the Good"]

[Text] **We know that there are 1.1 million members in party organizations in the Armed Forces. How many officers and warrant officers have recently left the party, and how many have joined it?**

**Or is that a secret?—Lt Col (Res) M. Grigorenko**

**Maj Gen A. Gorbachev, chief of the Organizational Party Work Directorate of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy:**

The fate of the CPSU has been discussed fairly intensely in the society of late. Some people, for example, even predict its end, saying that the party is on the point of disintegrating.

The facts indicate the reverse, however. Since the beginning of 1990 24,000 people have joined the party in the Armed Forces. During that same period 3,402 people have left the party in the army and navy. It is apparent from these figures that the number joining the party considerably surpasses the number leaving it for whatever reasons. Of those leaving 70% are blue- and white-collar workers and retirees, 22% officers (mainly those discharged from the Armed Forces), and 8% seagoing and shore-based warrant officers. The reasons for leaving the party vary: 24% are disappointed with their membership in the party; 8% have no faith in the restructuring; 30% leave because of social and living difficulties, and so forth.

A considerable portion of those expelled from the party have "forgotten" about their party obligations for a long time, have not paid their party dues promptly and have not participated in public life. The purification of the party of those members is only to the good. It helps to strengthen the CPSU's ranks, solidifies the union of like-minded communists and restores the people's trust in the party.

#### Armed Forces Komsomol Chief on Reorganization

90SV0039B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Lt Col A. Reshetnikov, chairman of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations, deputy chief for Komsomol work of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and member of the Bureau of the Komsomol CC, by Lt Col V. Zyubin, under the rubric "Topical Interviews": "Rejecting the Customary"]

[Text] **Lt Col A. Reshetnikov, chairman of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations, deputy chief for Komsomol work of the Main Political Directorate of the**

**Soviet Army and Navy, and member of the Bureau of the Komsomol CC, answers questions posed by our correspondent.**

[Zyubin] The USSR President's Ukase on the Reform of Political Organs of the Armed Forces has been published. In accordance with this document the policy of separating state and party functions is moving into the practical realm. The reform will affect the existing structures of Komsomol organizations in the army and navy. I know that this process is already underway. Tell us about the specific aspects.

[Reshetnikov] I would single out this feature. Our main concern is to see that the interests of the Komsomol members and the youth, who make up 60% of the army and navy personnel today, do not suffer as a result of the reorganization, that it not harm the system for working out and implementing state youth policy in the Armed Forces. What is more, any reorganization would be meaningless if it were not designed to achieve a new and higher quality. Another feature is its maximum consideration of the opinions and proposals of the servicemen, of all those interested in the fate of the Komsomol.

[Zyubin] What is planned for the immediate future?

[Reshetnikov] Unlike the party organizations, we have already established an elective structure for all the new organs. It has functioned for more than 6 months and has to a certain degree demonstrated its viability. This structure was set up democratically at the appropriate Komsomol conferences and plenums. Its restructuring should obviously be carried out in the same way.

The current reorganization of political organs is being effected within the framework of the overall process of military reform and separation of the functions of state and party organs in the nation, with the specification of appropriate functional priorities. The Komsomol is in a special situation in this respect, however. In the first place it never had any power and can therefore not divide power with anyone. In the second place, the Komsomol is not the party. This was established in decisions of the 21st Komsomol Congress. In implementing the reorganization of the army and navy Komsomol it would therefore be incorrect for us to copy the party, the new structures, forms and methods of party work.

It is planned to have maximum conformity of the functioning of party and Komsomol organization to the regulations and program documents, which clearly define the principles of relations between the party and the Komsomol. And these are based on unity of goals and tasks, comradely cooperation and interaction, with the recognition of complete independence for the Komsomol.

[Zyubin] Complete independence.... Is that realistic?

[Reshetnikov] At the present time there are more questions than answers in this matter. The material and

financial problems are the most difficult. Bear in mind that for the Komsomol structures to function normally, they will need their own premises, transportation, communication facilities, office equipment, a system for the training and advanced training of personnel, mass media facilities.... And what about the sustenance of the Komsomol workers. Membership dues alone are clearly not enough.

These are all difficult problems, but I am convinced that they can be resolved.

The solution can be found in making the Komsomol structures public and independently functioning entities as much as possible. We must significantly reduce the number of unassigned Komsomol workers and the material and financial support provided by the Komsomol CC and the Ministry of Defense, set up economically accountable, profit-making structures under the Komsomol committees, simplify as much as possible internal activities involving clerical work, keeping records on Komsomol members, document storage....

[Zyubin] You will agree that you are facing not just a regular reorganization, but also completely different working conditions. One cannot ignore the fact that youth not only comprise a majority of the servicemen, but also that the number of Komsomol members is dropping among the young servicemen, that they have an increasing diversity of public-political views and interests....

[Reshetnikov] It would be precipitate to build our plans for the future without considering the public-political situation in the nation, those processes occurring in the youth movement and the immediate prospects. These things cannot be ignored.

If we look at things objectively, we can see that the Komsomol work has long since outgrown its internal framework and is oriented toward all the army and navy youth. This is to a certain degree contrary to decisions coming out of the 21st Komsomol Congress for the Komsomol to give up its monopoly on influencing the youth. The military service has its own specific features, however, and in order to eliminate this contradiction it is planned during the reform of political organs to set up independent structures to work with the youth, up to the level of the regiment and the ship inclusively.

[Zyubin] Will this not seem like a restructuring within a restructuring?

[Reshetnikov] I have already said that we are taking into account the overall processes. The 28th party congress adopted a resolution "On the Youth Policy of the CPSU," and at the next session of the USSR Supreme Soviet it is planned to pass a law of the USSR "On the Basic Principles of State Youth Policy in the USSR." Bodies are being set up within state agencies to ensure implementation of the youth policy: a Presidential

Youth Foundation, youth structures in all the executive agencies of power.... It is obvious that the Armed Forces need a similar system.

[Zyubin] How soon will this reorganization be carried out? Judging from the editor's mail, the military Komsomol members are expecting changes and an answer to the rhetorical question: "What to do?"

[Reshetnikov] They should not wait for changes. They need to effect them. It is not a matter of new structures—although this too is essential—but of increasing the practical work. We need to turn to the tasks facing the military collectives and do that which is needed by and benefits the people. This will eliminate the rhetorical question: "To be or not to be?"

[Zyubin] If any of the readers have suggestions or thoughts on the reorganization of Komsomol organizations in the Armed Forces, where should they take them?

[Reshetnikov] A working group has been set up by decision of the Bureau of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations to collate information and suggestions on problems pertaining to the impending reorganization. Its telephone numbers are 293-48-83 and 296-56-50. We await your calls.

#### Rukh Head On Independent Ukrainian Army

91UN0016A Kiev LITERATURNA UKRAYINA  
in Ukrainian 13 Sept 90 p 4

[Interview with Ivan Drach, Rukh Head, by a LITERATURNA UKRAYINA correspondent: "Unite What Is Traditional With What Is Modern"]

[Text]

[Correspondent] When at the first session of today's Parliament of the Ukraine the issue concerning the armed forces of the Ukrainian SSR arose, when the discussion began about the clause concerning the armed forces in the Declaration of Sovereignty, what were you thinking about above all else?

[Drach] You know that when the declaration concerning our sovereignty was being discussed, I advanced the idea that the Ukraine in the future should be a permanently neutral nation and that it should adhere to the three nuclear-free principles.... Why do I mention this? Because here one immediately sees some kind of contradiction: on the one hand, we are struggling to have armed forces (it thus generally understood that there can be no type of sovereignty when there are no defense forces); and on the other hand, we have proclaimed permanent neutrality, no nuclear power.... But, if one is to think realistically and sharply then it becomes understandable that there no contradictions here.

Immediately after our declaration, after two weeks, Belorussia passed a similar document in which the same kind of principles were proclaimed. This is an answer to the claims and fears of many international circles, which

are interested in seeing our Soviet Empire being preserved—because they think that only when the hand of Gorbachev is at the atomic control panel, then there is an opportunity to preserve peace; but when these atomic weapons will be scattered in "national quarters" of the sort like Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, the Ukraine, and others—this will, so to speak, complicate the international situation to a great degree, destabilizing it. And that is why when we—Belorussia, the Ukraine, and other republics—offer to reject strategic armaments and give them away, for example, to Yeltsin (in which case, in the hands of only Russia)—then in this manner we may take away the big trump cards from international journalism, various political scientists, and advisors, who fear, for example, that Armenia will want to even the score with Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan with Kirghizia, and so on.

Just this fact should have been thought over, and the main point is that it should be reflected in the Declaration of the Ukraine's sovereignty.

The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet has resolved that the Ukraine's children should serve on its territory. This is the first step in establishing our armed forces. It is understood that slowly, gradually the army will become a Ukrainian Army. Naturally, the issued here also concerns the language to be used in this army, and the control to be exercised by the Association of Soldiers' Mothers of the Ukraine. In general, all the mothers of the Ukraine are to some extent tied to the army; naturally it is much easier for the youths to manage in the environment of the Ukraine itself, instead of filling up the ranks in the Pacific Ocean Fleet, so to speak, with our flesh and blood, to serve somewhere out there in Kamchatka or in the Baltic region. What sense is there for the residents of the Ukraine to fill up the ranks of all of those imperial structures... And that is why the majority of deputies of the Parliament—despite whatever convictions they may hold—nonetheless have agreed on all of this. I remember well that in the most responsible, painful moment, when during the voting, words were said that our children should serve on the territory of the Ukraine—this was the most critical point during the entire discussion of the declaration. And then 226 individuals voted "yea". Everyone suffered the most just in these moments...

[Correspondent] Then in Parliament a proposition was proclaimed that the minister of defense of sovereign Ukraine was to be a woman...

[Drach] I do not know whether the minister is to be a woman or a man, but that this must be a civil person, this is incontestable. Even the principle will be confirmed that we are shifting from being a militarized area to a demilitarized one. If this individual is to be a humanitarian—this too would be a good, correct step.

[Correspondent] What kind of historical tradition in the Ukrainian military will the future army model itself on?

[Drach] When one thinks about what kind of army this is to be, what kind of external appearance its military, service people will have, then in this area our master

artists of costume design and artists, will have a wide range to work with. They can consider simply the external "uniform" traditional dress of the Zaporozhians [Cossacks] or the Sich Riflemen. But the main thing does not involve this. But it lies in something else. The matter at hand lies at the very essence of the issue. First of all, there should be such an army [a national one]. And sooner or later all of the sovereign republics will get to this point!

[Correspondent] This army, in your view, should it be professional?

[Drach] I guess that it would have to be made up of two sections. Professionals are needed for the real army. And the other part [is to consist of] a certain type of service unit of a parade or decorative character. It would guard the Supreme Soviet in Kiev, the sacred, state historical places in Kharkov and Lvov. For these units one could have service for a set term—at least until we begin to set up our army.

[Correspondent] Will the causes for and the incidents of "hazing" disappear when there is a shift to a republic army?

[Drach] I guess that they must disappear for several reasons. For if we would have our own army, then this would be a national army, and it would bear the tradition of our historical kin and flesh. Service in it would be especially attractive to youths; high moral qualities of the future warriors will be established still in the kindergarten, and then—in children's organizations, whatever they may be called: "boy scouts" or "Cossacks" or... In a word, service will not have the character of exercising such a terrible degree of discrimination against a person, of deforming him, which is what "hazing" is all about, which nothing can be done about now. In addition to this, when the army's scope of activity will be limited (to the territory of the Ukraine)—there will appear a real possibility for parents to control how their children will serve.

For the Association of Soldiers' Mothers of the Ukraine I see a great future; therefore, the force of the influence of the family on the army—this is in fact the influence of the people of the Ukraine on its army, on how they will live and what they will do with our children. In this manner, the Ukrainian army should become imbued with a humanistic character.

[Correspondent] In other words, you perhaps, are adhering to the idea that the roots of "hazing" are in the structure, in the model of our supra-nation, where the center is in the union republics, in the autonomous republics, the oblasts, where there are younger and older brothers...

[Drach] Yes, the structure of the army reflects the structure of our empire. The situation in the army is an X-ray picture of the situation in which our society is ill with imperialism.

[Correspondent] To what extent is our historical experience to be marked by the army of the Ukraine?

[Drach] Naturally, the old traditions should be preserved. But let us not forget that we live in the present, in a very technological world; thus we will have a very modern army that shall incorporate the traditions of the contemporary American, French, and Japanese armies—whether we want this or not.

The traditions of the Zaporozhians [Cossacks] and of the Sich Riflemen should be united with those of the present, in order to, on the one hand, not have an army of technological worker-soldiers, and on the other hand—in order to not let matters degenerate to merely having forces dressed in traditional military uniforms...

[Correspondent] But perhaps more "ethnographism" is to be allowed for the national guard? One imagines model divisions, which would take part in ritual meetings with the leaders of other nations and at the airport...

[Drach] There should be a national guard and it should protect the President of the Ukraine (when one will be really chosen by the people, a President chosen [by an election] of multi-parties). Looking at the situation in general terms, the buds of our army will grow from the buds of our statehood, from our sovereignty. We still slowly grow and mature—and slowly our understanding of an army will grow. We aspire, to finally, get away from having the army being a place where our youth is grist for the mill, a place of sapping our young blood, a place where Russification occurs.

#### Military Coup Said Unlikely

91UM0060A *Riga BALTIYSKOYE VREM'YA*  
in Russian 18 Sep 90 p 3

[Article by Yu. Solntsev: "Is a Military Coup Possible in the USSR?"]

[Text] The question of the possibility of a military coup in the USSR is being discussed widely in the press of late. You can hear this thought very frequently in conversations with military personnel. Some of them believe that a military coup is the only way to preserve an empire that is collapsing before our eyes. How dangerous and real is such a threat? We will try to analyze it.

The worsening economic situation, uncertainty in what tomorrow will bring, and the weariness of the people from the disorder and confusion of the perestroika period are creating an objective basis for a military coup. It should also be added that the senior military leadership unquestionably would support such a measure.

But to execute a coup, in addition to the objective conditions, a subjective factor is also needed: i.e., there has to be a leader and organizer who has the capability to carry it out. It is this second factor that is absent. Stalin was the "great architect." In creating a totalitarian system of governing the state, he excluded the possibility

of a military coup itself. While conducting a general militarization of society, he was concerned about the security of his own authority. The system he established also functions today without a hitch.

What did Stalin do? Everything is brilliantly simple: He dispersed the armed formations among various departments, put people in charge who were loyal to him, and established strict control over them by KGB organs.

Nothing has changed since Stalin's time. And today in our country there exist: the Army, the KGB and its troops, and also almost half a million troops of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. In the event that any one of these three forces get out of control, it is possible to count on the remaining two. The probability of a situation when all of the armed formations of the state become insubordinate is practically equal to zero. The probability of a secret conspiracy of all three leaders of these organizations is possible only theoretically.

As the most numerous force, the Soviet Army constitutes the greatest danger in the event of a coup. But here also, the same principle of splitting up exists. Along with ground troops and their commands, there are the airborne troops with their commander in chief who in equal measure are subordinate through the Ministry of Defense to the president. Besides them, there are several divisions of well-trained and armed marines in the Navy. All of them taken together are permeated by party structures and are controlled by KGB organs.

One can be absolutely confident that a classical coup in our country is completely out of the question. Only one person can conduct a coup in our state. He is called M.S. Gorbachev.

This assertion appears absurd only at first glance. The fact is that, while completely ruling out a classical military coup, we cannot rule out the use of the armed forces for the attainment of political objectives in the event that all of the other means do not give the desired result. And it is not so important how it will be labeled—a coup or a strengthening of presidential authority, the prevention of interethnic clashes, defense of the integrity of the Union, or still something else.

The international weight of the Soviet Union and the prestige of its leaders and their influence on world politics have always been based exclusively on military power. By subordinating virtually the entire economy of the country to military needs and by robbing and ruining the people of the USSR, the ruling clique of the CPSU achieved military strategic parity in the 1970's with the richest countries of the world. A superpower that was impoverished, but armed to the teeth, brought fear to the countries of the West. They were forced not only to cope with the Soviet Union, but to curry favor with it.

If the "mailed fist" does not remain, then the Soviet Union loses its former influence in the world. Together with this, the influence, grandeur, and capabilities of the president of the USSR personally will fall. It is here that

the interests of the military-industrial complex and M.S. Gorbachev coincide completely.

Therefore, the president of the USSR will agree to a recognition of the independence of the Baltic countries only in the most extreme case.

The loss of the Baltics will significantly weaken military power of the Soviet Union. With the acquisition of independence by Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, troops will have to be withdrawn from the vitally important centers of Europe and the world's maritime communications routes, and the system of defense will have to be built on the territory of Belorussia and Russia. This will require a lot of time, enormous financial means, and material resources. Practically all of the garrisons now deployed on the territories of Latvia and Estonia will be redeployed to Pskov, Novgorod, and Leningrad Oblasts. Owing to a poorly developed network of roads and communications and the absence of an airfield and construction capabilities, the construction of new troop disposition locations will be very expensive. The Soviet Union does not have and it will not have the necessary resources for this in the near future. We are talking here about hundreds of millions of rubles.

The situation with Lithuania is particularly complicated. Its territory cuts the center off from Kaliningrad Oblast, on whose territory a major grouping of troops is concentrated, "hanging" over Germany. This "Soviet club" in the hands of M.S. Gorbachev today compels the Germans to treat him with special respect. Lithuania's acquisition of independence disrupts land routes and signals communications of this group of forces with the center and renders it dangerously vulnerable in a military sense, and it significantly reduces its danger for Europe.

M.S. Gorbachev cannot possibly agree with this. In one of his speeches, the president, departing from his written text, tossed out a phrase to the effect that the Russians had shed too much blood in the Baltic region to give it up. True, he then broke off and did not make clear to whom he would not give up the Baltic. This phrase did not appear in newspaper reports, although being unplanned and not written out ahead of time, it was sincere.

Therefore, M.S. Gorbachev will never agree to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBTS ON THIS SCORE. THAT COULD HAPPEN ONLY UNDER ANOTHER PRESIDENT, OR IN THE CASE OF THE COMPLETE BREAKUP OF THE USSR, WHICH WOULD AMOUNT TO THE SAME THING.

#### Chances of Military Coup Considered

91UM0058A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 37, 23-30 Sep 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Andrei Nuikin under the rubric "The Army and Society": "Military Coup in the USSR?"; first three paragraphs are boxed item]

[Text] Two presidential decrees published the other day were addressed to the army. The first—on reforming political bodies; the second—on enhancing servicemen's social and legal protection. Both documents prove that "the army and society" problem is not the invention of the press, but a reality. The army leadership's response to the first of the two decrees proves the same thing.

In the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (Red Star) dated September 6, the Chief of the Main Political Department said the separation of the state and party functions is a natural and logical process. The Commander of the Airborne Troops put it bluntly: no depoliticization problem exists for the Armed Forces. The approaches are diametrically opposite. And this cannot but alert and excite society, anxiously following events.

Thus MN has decided to return to "the army and society" theme with Andrei Nuikin's article and a reply from independent military experts to a "group of refugees" questioning the facts set forth in the article "January in Baku" (MN, No 33).

When a representative from Magadan battled his way to a microphone at the 28th CPSU Congress and, his voice trembling from excitement, demanded "on behalf of a large group of deputies" that: a) his microphone not be switched off; b) the inviolability of all those sitting in the hall be guaranteed; c) the Central Committee and the Politburo be removed immediately; d) the Congress be declared an Extraordinary Congress; e) all authority be transferred to it; f) the powers of those sitting in the hall be prolonged for another five years; g) these proposals immediately be put to a vote, I realized that our rightists were ripe for a coup.

I was not alone. And we must not fail to voice our apprehensions aloud, in public. A discussion of this question at Moscow News was suggested by members of the Shchit (Shield) union: V. Urazhtsev, its co-chairman, RSFSR people's deputy; Major N. Moskovchenko, deputy to the Moscow City Soviet; Major (res.) Ye. Minin; Lieutenant-Colonel S. Budko and Major V. Khvatikov, deputy to the Moscow City Soviet. Also taking part in the round table were USSR people's deputy A. Adamovich, journalist A. Nuikin, literary critic L. Saraskina, Chairperson of the All-Union Committee of Soldiers' Fathers and Mothers N. Sheludyakova, and MN's Ye. Yakovlev and A. Flerovsky.

The discussion was long and heated, but we did not come to a unanimous conclusion and both the "optimists" and the "pessimists" agreed that the current situation is alarming.

#### Food for Thought

According to the Shchit union, the army has a plan for taking control of the country, region by region, beginning with the Soviet Far East. On the appointed Day, between 6 and 8 a.m., power will shift to the military in the USSR's eastern time zone (in Moscow it will shift between 10 p.m. and midnight). The mass media will be

taken over. Transmitters for jamming foreign radio stations will be switched on. Army transmitters will be used to broadcast instructions. This pattern will be followed from one time zone to the next, moving westward towards Moscow. They'll impose a state of emergency in the Soviet Far East and see how the Army and Navy react. When the takeover gets to Novokuznetsk, how will the coal miners react? If something untoward happens the coup could be called off before it reaches Moscow.

Do you seriously think that preparations like these can remain a secret, that Moscow doesn't know about them?

The main danger is that these preparations aren't per se illegal. This is simply the procedure provided by the Constitution for introducing the state of emergency. If there are such terms as "state of emergency" and "martial law", there should be procedures to introduce them. But if the procedure is implemented by the military, the military will end up controlling the situation, which means...

#### Law and Order

Fear makes mountains out of molehills. You don't know the military mentality. The military would not take part in high treason, even the dyed-in-the-wool Stalinists among them. Chief of Staff of Paratroopers Lieutenant-General Ye. Podkolzin said in a recent interview: "I personally would side with the law. We should not meddle in anything. The army is the army."

Do you know that orders are laws for our army? Podkolzin also said: "We have had two divisions stationed in Lithuania since 1945. All members of the local government and party bodies, all our friends ask: 'When are you guys going to put the place in order, bash heads?' Well, as soon as we helped them recapture the Central Committee building, we received a phone call from the President: don't do that. So we sent the troops away." Podkolzin added: "I'm a military man. I would prefer it if they gave us orders, even if they conflict with the law, but there should be orders."

That's it: even if they want to help their friends bash the perestroika men's heads, they can't do it without orders. An army! In this sense, democratization of the Armed Forces benefits from the "tame" General Yazov's being Defence Minister. Officers say: "Long live old man Yazov!"

Some men in the forces aren't "tame". Candidates for the role of military dictator include the notorious generals Makashev, Rodionov and Gromov. But there are more influential and cunning men. They keep a low profile. Waiting for orders.

Whose orders?

"The only organization that can give instructions to the KGB is the Central Committee of the Communist Party," says former KGB Major-General Oleg Kalugin.

The same goes for the army. Until recently Soviet military policy was based on the CPSU guidance of the Armed Forces. I know people on the Central Committee, I worked with them in the Main Political Department of the Armed Forces, so I can say that the CPSU Central Committee's state-and-law division still controls the MVD, the KGB and the Armed Forces.

But our parliament has a special Committee for Defence and State Security.

Yes. Of its 38 members, seven are military, 19 are from the military-industrial complex, two are KGB, and five are secretaries of regional party committees. The parliamentary committee was handpicked by the CC state-and-law division. To ensure "strict control" over themselves, of course.

#### The Party Calls the Shots

If the Russian Communist Party, which accounts for 60 per cent of the CPSU membership, had someone like the conservative Ivan Polozkov as its head or anti-Semites from the Leningrad "initiative group", orders would soon come.

Well, the CPSU isn't led by Polozkov, but by Gorbachev! He has no use for a right-wing coup. His future depends on perestroika. He is a reformer and a fighter for the "new thinking". Why should he go back on everything he has accomplished so far?

It is especially worrisome that our democratic guarantees are easy to breach.

But let's go back to what the Magadan delegate was saying. Do you seriously think this was the spontaneous outpouring of one hysterical delegate? That this wasn't planned? To promote certain events? Which events? It was good that Gorbachev kept his head and managed to defuse the tension. Have you considered what might have happened if half the delegates had yelled: "Put it to a vote! Now!"? The audience was still under the influence of the Russian "foundation" congress and capable of telling the Central Committee, the Politburo and Gorbachev to declare the CPSU Congress extraordinary, to impose a countrywide state of emergency and to extend their powers to five years.

It's easy to proclaim one's powers, not so easy to take control.

What do you mean? Voting there were the top bosses from the Defence Ministry, the General Staff, the Main Political Department, the KGB, the MVD, and the Procurator's Office. For them "party decisions" are supreme law; most of them can't wait to go back to old practices. As for ending parliaments, one company of paratroopers could do it.

So your idea of a coup is partocrats giving perestroika a "thumbs down", and the military giving orders to shoot members of independent parties and groups associated with perestroika?

No one would say "down with perestroika". They might say that perestroika is in jeopardy, that that adventurist Gorbachev has brought the USSR and its economy to ruin, has betrayed the socialist ideals, etc. They might set up a committee for national salvation, declare a state of emergency or martial law.

#### 'Russians Would Not Shoot at Russians'

Some people say: "Russians would not shoot at Russians." Does this mean they would shoot at non-Russians? Wouldn't non-Russians (most of the army) shoot at Russians? The Civil War showed that Russians wouldn't hesitate to shoot at Russians if ideologically conditioned to do so. (We see the process of such conditioning taking place today.)

I asked some paratroopers (considered "the CPSU's strike force") if they would shoot at their own people. They said they would if given orders. Even in less exotic armed services some conscripts and young lieutenants toy with the idea of shooting at "that sort of people", just to show them.

You're forgetting the division in the army. There are democrats even among the generals with countless radical reform advocates among the middle and junior officers.

They are not countless, they are counted and kept tabs on. There is an informer in each platoon and section.

On the whole, our army is not bloodthirsty. Middle-rank officers, from colonels on down, are moderately anti-party. Everybody (except political officers) wants depoliticization. But this sentiment is still weaker than the influence of ideological education. Uninhibited perestroika reports are banned in the army, all political discussions are based on lines approved decades ago. Independent organizations are officially described as destructive. There are lots of exercises. We know what they mean from experience. The men don't sleep for a week, two weeks or three weeks, eating inferior food. They are irritated, angry and aggressive. If an exercise involves shooting, everyone carries full sets of live ammunition. Thus troops can easily be employed to achieve certain political objectives.

Still, it is not generals but captains and lieutenants who give troops orders to shoot. And they don't think about the partocracy's interests.

There is a cruel purging of the democratic elements among officers disguised as personnel cuts. The Central Committee conference on December 20, 1989, presided over by Razumovsky ruled that every officer who joins the Shchit union is subject to dismissal from the Armed Forces within 24 hours. Loyalists are being put in control of vital positions. The most aggressive words at the 28th CPSU Congress were heard from the commander of the Volga-Urals Military District. Perhaps 80 per cent of the apparatus of the Main Political Department formerly

served in this district. Such nominations to higher posts not only reduce the number of officers but also teach them obedience.

### Slouching Towards Dictatorship

There is a growing risk of an unwitting slide into a state of emergency. An emergency situation is now part of daily life in a growing number of areas around the country. Economic collapse, complete stoppages of supplies of food and fuel to entire cities and regions are likely. Ecological disasters, strikes, ethnic clashes, millions of refugees. People may even ask for a state of emergency to be declared! One increasingly has the impression that someone is helping this to happen. People are having it dinned into their heads that a state of emergency and martial law mean peace and order we thirst so much.

But what is a state of emergency? It is a legal state introduced for a specified period due to extraordinary circumstances and permitting the use of special measures. Hitler's dictatorship, by the way, was started on the basis of "extraordinary powers" granted to him by the government due to extraordinary circumstances, and most certainly, for a specified period. Our nation knows all too well the sort of "special measures" extraordinary commissions opt for. We don't seem to learn our lessons. New generations would evidently like to toy with extraordinary situations. In an extraordinary situation, the operation of elected bodies and the constitutions is suspended, newspapers are closed down, members of independent organizations are arrested, and the borders are sealed. Then we would see why we were conditioned not to be afraid of the word "emergency" and to see it as a refuge from all the horrors visited on us by freedom.

You again have visions of secret enemies?

They aren't all that secret. "The military-industrial complex is rapidly being replaced by a military-ideological complex. A victory by fascist forces is a real threat," people's deputy Yuri Ryzhov told MN in July. "I am turning to the Armed Forces to stop the genocide of the Russian people started by the October Revolution" reads one comment in a perfectly legal newspaper called MOSKOVSKY STROITEL (Moscow Builder).

### 'Just in Case'

On this worried note I end my review of the arguments and views expressed at this round table. We don't have proof at this point that rightists are preparing a coup. The USSR's plan to introduce martial law isn't criminal in itself. The Defence Ministry must have it just in case. But only given a firm guarantee that this plan will not be used against the people, democracy and the constitutional system. Alas, unless our armed forces and law and order bodies have been depoliticized, unless the activity and the budgets of the army and the KGB are controlled by the parliament, unless generals savaging perestroika and insulting the President are removed from their offices and denied their cushy pensions, all guarantees

will resemble the one given Ales Adamovich by the architects of the Chernobyl disaster: "Swear to God, the reactors won't explode again!" We already know the price of such pledges. The price is a copper. A Soviet non-convertible copper.

Thus advocates of perestroika, democratic-minded people and people in general have every reason to think of retaliatory measures in case martial law is imposed to restore the Stalin-Brezhnev socialism. Democratic parties, workers unions and committees, youth organizations should calmly consider how they can retaliate given a military dictatorship. Given a state of emergency, with glasnost suppressed and all parties save one banned, and communications disrupted, this would be incomparably harder to do. Everything should be thought out down to the minutest details.

We should counter the obscurantism, irresponsibility and hysteria of those doomed with our reserve, cohesion and responsibility.

### Shchit Official Defends Coup Charges

91UM0067A Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian No 40, Oct 90 (Signed to press 1 Oct 90) p 6

[Report on interview with reserve Colonel Vitaliy Urazhtsev, cochairman of Shchit and USSR people's deputy, by Mikhail Sokolov; place and date not given: "The Soldiers Went"]

[Text] A polemic developed in the legislature last week between KGB deputies and leaders on the one hand, and the Ministry of Defense on the other, concerning the strange troop movements in September around Moscow. D. Yazov stated that the information of Deputy S. Belozertsev, which he gleaned from the Shchit union, did not accord with what actually happened.

What kind of an organization is Shchit? Its leaders tell us that the basis for the union for social protection of military servicemen, individuals liable to be called into the military, and their families was laid in 1982. Its membership includes about 10,000 people. Up to 80 percent of them are "secret" members. The reason? Officers are expelled from the Army for participating in the activity of this organization. During the time the union has been in existence about a thousand officers have been expelled from the Army for political reasons. (Incidentally, young officers who were being refused discharges from the Army actively took advantage of this right after Shchit was created.) Now, as Shchit leaders report, the majority of members of the organization have entered its ranks in order to prevent the use of the Armed Forces, on orders from the partocracy, against the people themselves, to protect the rights and freedoms of military servicemen, and to rid the Army of "dedovshchina" [hazing] and corruption. Experts from the Shchit union have studied the circumstances surrounding the sending of troops into Baku, pointing out a number of crimes committed by military servicemen against peaceful people, and they are developing their own concept of military reform. We met

with Vitaliy Urazhtsev, cochairman of *Shchit*, a USSR people's deputy, and a reserve colonel, the day after General of the Army Yazov's "denial".

[Urazhtsev] We are sticking to our guns, that was not training. The facts reported by Sergey Kudinov, chief of the Political Department of the Ryazan Airborne School and a people's deputy of the Ryazan Oblast Soviet, are exactly in keeping with what happened. He has been a member of our organization for three years now, and we were forced to make Colonel Kudinov "go public" only because of the extraordinary situation that existed. The fact that troops and equipment were being diverted to Moscow is confirmed, for example, by the military transport aviation pilots, who right before 16 September transported units of the Pskov airborne division.

It is difficult to say anything about the reliability of Yazov's statement if he is wrong even in minor things: for example, the minister said Kudinov was a member of Democratic Russia even though he is still a member of the CPSU. Incidentally, they have already managed to remove Kudinov from his position, violating his status as a people's deputy... And the map that was shown to the deputies? I can draw you one like that overnight.

[Sokolov] Tell me, what was Colonel Kudinov to have done if they had taken his school to Moscow in order to take over power?

[Urazhtsev] He would simply have done everything he could to stop the transfer. If a decent officer is ordered to fire into a crowd of people, he should not do it. Incidentally, during the September "training" the Ryazan regiment, when moving toward Moscow, was halted by vigilant officers and trainees at the Kolomensk artillery school. True, they were deceived and told that the unit had been called to a parade.

[Sokolov] What do you think is the reason for these troop movements?

[Urazhtsev] This is not the first such incident. The same thing occurred in February of this year. I think this is related to fear on the part of the partocracy: Only negative information floats to the top, and the system is scaring itself. It seems to them that it is just about time to pay for 73 years of antipopular dictatorship and they are terrified by the specter of anticomunism... Yet the CPSU leadership, which still has jurisdiction over the KGB, the Army, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, cannot but know that the democrats are the main opponents of violence. They are accusing us saying that *Shchit* is all but creating a military detachment. What nonsense! The skeleton of *Shchit* is comprised of junior officers, company and battalion commanders, people who are close to the enlisted men, those who should NOT TAKE UP ARMS if they are given an order to attack the people, who should HOLD BACK the units at the time when destructive forces are trying to destabilize the situation.

[Sokolov] The Ministry of Defense asserts that it has no plans to introduce martial law in the country.

[Urazhtsev] As an officer who has worked in the Ministry of Defense for almost 10 years, I can state that they have always had these plans to be applied in the event that extraordinary circumstances arise. It is another matter that they had practically not developed it before. We now have a mass of reports from the districts and troops about training taking place there. In particular, they were conducted in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in April, and then in the Far East Military District and in the Pacific Ocean Fleet. According to the plan, martial law is to be introduced gradually, beginning with the east through the various zones, and it should reach Moscow in eight hours. This is a convenient variant—it is always possible to follow the reaction of the people and, if necessary, turn back and say that what was going on in the east was training.

[Sokolov] Where do you get your information?

[Urazhtsev] There is not a single secret directive we do not know about. We have enough people sympathetic to democracy, including generals, both in the Main Political Directorate and surrounding Yazov. Some day, as was the case with Kudinov, the country will learn their names.

[Sokolov] Tell me, did your union conduct investigations of military crimes in Afghanistan and Baku?

[Urazhtsev] Facts about illegal actions in Baku were turned over to the military prosecutor. We have information about Afghanistan as well. In particular, the Ministry of Defense has understated the number of deaths—they did not include, for example, those who died while being transported to the USSR. Incidentally, the publication of the lists was forbidden precisely because the parents did not find the names of their deceased offspring on them. A scandal broke out... The people are talking about terrible things: For example, a subunit was sent on an operation on New Year's Day but the commanders got drunk and...forgot about it. Many soldiers froze to death in the mountains. All these cases are subject to investigation. We are far from having the whole truth about this criminal war.

[Sokolov] How do you assess the current situation in the Army?

[Urazhtsev] This is very difficult. The soldiers have to put up with "dedovshchina," lice, and slop for food. Each year an entire division of our men die—10,000-12,000 servicemen, an equal number end up in jail, and three times as many as that suffer from illness or injuries. It is impossible to drag the military reform out for decades, as Yazov suggests. We are faced with two dangers: spontaneous rebellion and a military coup.

It is no accident that on 24 September 43 Russian people's deputies called for the country's military servicemen to be vigilant in a situation where it is probable that attempts will be made to use the Army for political purposes, to exhibit restraint, courage, and patriotism, and not to allow the use of weapons against the people. I

think that if events develop according to today's scenario, Russia will have to think not only about creating its own ministry of defense—Shchit has suggested Tatyana Karyagina for the position of its leader—but also about its own national army, in order to provide for internal security, sovereignty, and the normal course of democratic reforms. Otherwise the Makashovs might get into office...

**Former Shchit Aide Discusses 'Schism'**

91UM0056A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
23 Oct 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Reserve Lieutenant Colonel S. Budko:  
"Shchit' Has Split or What Is Its Cochairman Asking?"]

[Text] For a long time our editorial staff has been receiving information concerning the fact that in the coordinating council of the Shchit league for the social protection of servicemen there is a lack of unity in assessing the activities of one of the league's cochairmen, comrade Uraztsev. His extremism, flagrant repression of views different from his own among his associates in Shchit, and his persecution of criticism in the best traditions of the stagnant era have forced part of the members to announce their withdrawal from the league and the organization of a Moscow branch, which was officially registered under a different name shortly thereafter.

And here are some new facts. Today we are publishing, with a small abridgment, the statement of the former assistant to People's Deputy to the RSFSR V. Uraztsev. The assistant refused to perform his duties in view of a disagreement in principle with the cochairman's politics and with his unwillingness to accept his assistant's work methods and personal conduct.

As chairman of the organizing committee for preparing the 2nd Congress of the Shchit league and coordinator between the league and the Federation of Russia's Independent Trade Unions, Reserve Lieutenant Colonel S. Budko, candidate of philosophical sciences, considers it necessary to make Uraztsev's true goals known, thus purging the Shchit league of his discreditable methods of doing business.

Respected comrades! The idea of social protection for servicemen, which was conceived at the 1st Congress of the Shchit league, is now more pressing than ever. I often ask myself the following question: why do the majority of servicemen regard our organization with definite suspicion and why are we not performing our primary mission. There are many reasons for this. And the first reason is that Shchit's rank and file is not able to realize its democratic potential, because it has run up against the harsh authoritarian opposition, which the right wing of Shchit, led by V. G. Uraztsev and his assistant, V. P. Turchin, is putting up against it. And if one is completely candid, these two men have essentially declared that they are dissolving the coordinating committee and forming a

new governing body for Shchit. If the committee was elected by the congress, is this a proper, lawful declaration?

Moreover, Uraztsev recently declared that the 500-day economic program will not be fulfilled, because the forces of the opposition are very great. But if that is the way things stand, there will be a civil war. Therefore, all members of the Shchit league must prepare for it. It is necessary to help the present political system to collapse since it is unable to do this itself.

Thus, Uraztsev, Turchin, and certain other members of Shchit have forgotten the principal notion for establishing our organization—the social protection of servicemen—and its invigorating beginning.

I have been working in the Shchit league for about four months. However, I do not know whether so much as one serviceman has been protected in the social sphere by the league. Uraztsev and Turchin have made the primary mission of its activities an aggressive struggle against the present-day Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate for the Soviet Army and Navy, by means of political rallies, tusovka [translation unknown], picketing, foul language, etc. Their policy is directed toward open confrontation with the organs of government. Their aspiration is to turn Shchit into a political party with grave political demands. Moreover, this future party should be a paramilitary party, in which monarchist procedures would be revived. Although, at the same time it should be noted that the league's coordinating committee completely rejected this position.

The emotional and psychological tension in Shchit have reached their zenith. I think that it is possible to obtain a maximum reduction of this tension only if the coordinating committee by chance dissociates itself from Uraztsev, Turchin, and their supporters. This is the only thing that can save our presently humanitarian organization from a split. Therefore, I have taken such a step—I have given up my certification as Deputy Uraztsev's assistant, since I am unable to support him in his far right extremist activities. We must radically change our means for achieving our main goal—the social protection of servicemen—by eliminating speculation in slogans, playing on passions, and intimidation and instigation.

What must be done in order to achieve this? Since Shchit came into being in response to social problems existing in the army, which have been particularly aggravated during the process of cutting back the army, we must immediately enter into a direct dialogue with the institutions of State power, form a coalition with the leaders of the Ministry of Defense, and tirelessly search for common ground based upon the priority of values common to all mankind.

The Federation of Independent Russian Trade Unions (FNRP), which is interested in social insurance for

servicemen and in their retraining and job placement upon a reduction in forces, can render a great deal of assistance in this.

It appears that the 2nd Congress of the Shchit league, which is scheduled for 17-18 November 1990, should concentrate its work primarily not on the elaboration of a program of political struggle, but on a true concern for the fate of servicemen.

I am convinced that the Shchit league must not function as a party. It is a socio-political movement of aggressive interaction with various social and State organizations, which do not advocate chauvinism and racism.

Shchit's activities should be diverse and widespread. Most importantly—all its activities should further social protection for servicemen. Every person wearing shoulder boards should be guaranteed that in case of discharge from the Soviet Armed Forces, he will never be forgotten by society.

**Editorial Comment:** This man's statement has found itself at the heart of socio-political life in the capital, and moreover, the Shchit league cannot be taken as a special case of a social organization being widely known now in the capital for its scandalous actions. The warning about the intentions of comrade Uraztsev, people's deputy to the RSFSR, "to prepare for the collapse of the political system in our country," is extremely grave. We would remind you that the "information" about a military coup d'état, which was supposedly being prepared, started to circulate from the same extremist circles in Shchit.

And here is another piece of news. The last meeting of the coordinating committee already took place without V. Uraztsev. But, judging from appearances, he and his accomplices will actively begin to implement the idea of transforming a social organization into a political party founded on military principles.

#### **Wider Republic Role in Running Army Promised**

*91UM0068A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 40, 6-12 Oct 90 p 2*

[Interview with I. Novoselov, consultant of the sector for questions of defense and state security of the USSR Supreme Soviet Secretariat, by N. Nikolayev; place and date not given; published under the rubric "The USSR Armed Forces Possess Approximately 42 Million Hectares of Land": "The Army and the New Union Treaty"]

[Text]

[Nikolayev] Igor Petrovich, you are working on the draft of a protocol on military aspects of the Union treaty. Describe what is contained in it that is important and new.

[Novoselov] The fundamental thing that we have succeeded in devising through our joint efforts (representatives of the majority of the Union republics, with the exception of the Baltic republics, are taking part in the

work) is that the Armed Forces should remain unified. In addition, each sovereign republic will delegate its representative the right of a deciding vote in the Defense Council, which did not exist previously.

The Union republics will also be given the right to participate in forming military policy, resolving issues regarding the stationing of troops, determining the number of conscripts and the manning levels of the Armed Forces as a whole, determining the budget of the Army and Navy, and many other things.

[Nikolayev] I know that notwithstanding the demands of several representatives of republics that servicemen serve in their own republics, there has been a decision to retain the principle of extraterritoriality.

[Novoselov] What can one say about Tajiks serving in Tajikistan and Uzbeks serving in Uzbekistan? We are not just talking about the USSR as a huge country, but rather as a state possessing a significant nuclear potential, a navy (including ocean-going submarines), Strategic Rocket Forces, strategic aviation, etc. Does this mean that the Strategic Rocket Forces will only be manned by Kazakhs because many of them are on their territory? Or only by residents of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], who also have a good number of these "points"? And why do Tajiks not have the right to serve in the Navy?

[Nikolayev] But one might ask why send a Tajik to sea when he might as well be sent to the mountains.

[Novoselov] I fully agree with this; the principle of volunteerism is necessary. The wish of the conscript must necessarily be taken into consideration. And in general many (not all, of course) problems similar to this should vanish when our Armed Forces change over to the principle of staffing by contract.

[Nikolayev] These days the idea of bringing in the Army to resolve interethnic problems is condemned almost universally. The union of soldiers' mothers is actively protesting the intervention of Russian boys in conflicts such as the Armenian-Azerbaijani one. What can you say on this subject?

[Novoselov] Our draft protocol says that the Armed Forces are designated for the defense of the Union from attack from outside. As for internal conflicts, I believe that public security forces or formations should be created in each republic to resolve them. Citizens of each specific republic will belong to them on a voluntary basis.

[Nikolayev] There are paragraphs in the draft dedicated to issues of the land used by the military.

[Novoselov] The reason for this is that currently the USSR Armed Forces possesses approximately 42 million hectares of land. And today the question of how the local soviets will give out their land is a very heated one: Will the USSR Armed Forces pay for it, how much, etc. On one hand, if the Army is required to pay for the land like

everyone else, then its whole budget will go for that. But on the other hand, payment is necessary—because then the military will not take more land than it needs and there will be more responsibility. I believe that in this situation we need varied forms: One value for the construction of housing and dachas, and another for military areas.

[Nikolayev] Will leadership of the Army from the center be retained?

[Novoselov] Of course. If each leads the military in his own republic, rayon, or city, what will that do to the Armed Forces? Any military conflict under modern conditions simply does not allow a minute of time to conduct any kind of negotiations. And no one is insured against conflicts. Today our country has normal relations with practically all countries of the world. But what will happen if any state should change to a more reactionary government? After all, France and China did not sign the agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which, incidentally, Pakistan and Israel will soon possess. And the number of such countries is growing. As a sovereign state we should know how to defend our people, and we can only do that through the presence of a unified center.

#### CPSU Military Policy Committee Named

91UM0083B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 1 Nov 90 First Edition p 1

[“List of Members of CPSU Central Committee Military Policy Commission”—KRASNAYA ZVEZDA headline]

[Text] **O.D. Baklanov**—secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the commission.

Commission members:

**P.M. Abdurakhmanov**—first secretary of the Samarkand Obkom [oblast committee] of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, Samarkand.

**S.V. Aleksandrov**—adjuster of radioelectronic equipment and instruments of the Rostov Almaz Production Association of the USSR Ministry of Communications, Rostov-on-Don.

**B.A. Achalov**—airborne troop commander, Moscow.

**B.S. Batalin**—secretary of the party committee of the Yantar shipbuilding plant of the USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, Kaliningrad.

**O.O. Burdenko**—general director of the Vilnius Production Association imeni 60-Letiye Oktyabrya of the USSR Ministry of Communications, Vilnius, Lithuanian SSR.

**V.A. Bashurin**—adjuster of radio equipment of the Punane Ret plant of the Tallinn production association of radioelectronic equipment of the USSR Ministry of Communications, Tallinn, Estonian SSR.

**A.K. Grigoryev**—machine operator at the steam locomotive depot, Daugavpils, Latvian SSR.

**A.I. Gromoglasov**—first secretary of the Arkhangelsk CPSU Obkom, Arkhangelsk.

**G.I. Derabin**—brigade leader of hull assemblers and repairmen of the Nerpa ship repair plant of the USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, Murmansk-60, Snezhnogorsk.

**G.R. Ibragimov**—driller of the Moscow Neftyanyye Kamni naval administration of the Kaspmorneftegaz Association, Baku, Azerbaijan SSR.

**G.L. Karunin**—deputy military unit commander, Yoshakr-Ola.

**Yu.V. Kuznetsov**—general director of the Prikaspiyskiy Mining and Metallurgical Combine Production Association, Mangistaus Oblast, Kazakh SSR, Shevchenko.

**V.S. Kulikov**—milling machine operator at the Gorkiy Aviation Production Association imeni S. Ordzhonikidze of the USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry, Nizhniy Novgorod.

**M.V. Leonchenko**—secretary of the party committee of the Permskiy Machine Building Plant imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy Production Association of the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry, Perm.

**M.A. Moiseyev**—chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces—USSR first deputy minister of defense, Moscow.

**L.L. Nikiforov**—general director of the Kiev Production Association imeni S.P. Korolev of the USSR Ministry of Communications, Kiev, Ukrainian SSR.

**V.A. Prudnikov**—troop commander of the Moscow Anti-Aircraft Defense District, Moscow.

**A.M. Raylyan**—deputy commander of the helicopter regiment, Carpathian Military District, Sambor, Lvov Oblast.

**Yu.R. Rusakov**—captain of the steamship Mikhail Kalinin of the Novosibirsk base of the Western Siberian River Shipping Line, Novosibirsk.

**Yu.P. Semenov**—general designer of the Energiya Scientific Production Association of the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building, Moscow Oblast.

**G.A. Khvatov**—commander of the Pacific Ocean Fleet, Vladivostok.

**Ye.S. Khilchenko**—assembly worker of the Tulskiy Oruzheynyy Zavod Production Association of the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry, Tula.

**Ye.I. Shaloshnikov**—commander in chief of the Air Force, Moscow.

**N.I. Shlyaga**—chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, Moscow.

**D.T. Yazov**—USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow.

**Ye.I. Yarkin**—ship assembly brigade leader of the Zelenodolskiy Plant imeni A.M. Gorkiy of the USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, Zelenodolsk, Tatar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic].

### Moldavian National Military Unit Formed

*91UM0083A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
2 Nov 90 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Col N. Mulyar: "Why a National Army?"]

[Text] Many observers think the situation in the south of Moldova [Moldavia] will not begin to improve sharply until all detachments of "volunteers" return home and the situation here is monitored by subdivisions of internal forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. But meanwhile there are still attempts to introduce the republic militia into the territory that is densely populated by the Gagauz, which will make it possible for the provisional committee of the Moldovan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet to implement the measures envisioned by the provisions for a state of emergency.

Unfortunately, passions are inflamed and groups of individual "volunteers" which, even as they are returning home, are organizing rallies, are giving ultimatums to the authorities.

The building of the DOSAAF school in Ungeny was blocked. The demand: to fire the principal and teachers who do not know the Moldovan language. In the south of

Moldova, People's Front activists are picketing the military communications center, and a demand was made that the USSR president take measures against the "separatists of the Gagauz and Dnestr republics" within 48 hours, and S. Akhromeyev, USSR people's deputy and marshal of the Soviet Union, arrived in Moldova within 24 hours to meet with the voters.

They are beginning to create the first formation of a national army in the republic—the Tiras-Tigina battalion. It accepts individuals of Moldavian nationality from former border troops, airborne troops, and also participants in combat in Afghanistan.

Republic television broadcast a program on how in the village of Chimishliya (the headquarters of the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs staff and a provisional committee of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet, which was formed to provide special management of regions densely populated by the Gagauz, are still located here) convoys of new buses and trucks acquired with specially collected funds from the residents of the republic were turned over to the Tiras-Tigina battalion. Opening the ceremony held on this occasion, Moldovan Prime Minister M. Druk noted that the creation of the equipment actually marks the creation of a national army, and he expressed the hope that in time the battalion would grow into a division and would go down in the history of the republic.

And what do the simple people think about this? Here are some lines from a letter from a soldier to the president of the Moldovan SSR, which was published in the newspaper of the Odessa military district, ZASH-CHITNIK RODINY. The letter was signed by 49 soldiers of Moldavian nationality: "We do not need to separate! We do not need to spend the people's money on creating a new army! The people and we soldiers do not need this. It would be better to take the money you intend to spend on creating an army and use it to further improve the well-being of the people."

**Kalashnikov on Nature of Future War**

91UM0074A Moscow VOYENNYY VESTNIK  
in Russian No 9, Sep 90 pp 9-12

[Article by Vice Admiral V. Kalashnikov and Captain 1st Rank V. Valdens: "How Much Defense Is Enough?"]

[Text] The new political thinking while becoming an alternative to nuclear insanity, has placed on the agenda the need to create a comprehensive system of international peace and security. The prospect of a way out of the exhausting economics of the arms race and reduction of defense expenditures today not only makes the Soviet people but also world society happy. This also explains our readers' enormous interest in articles on military political problems. In particular, Doctor of Historical Sciences A.G. Arbatov's article "How Much Defense is Sufficient?" in MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN Magazine (1989, No 3) has not passed unnoticed.

The author raises a number of questions associated with the structure and operational-strategic utilization of the armed forces, touches upon individual aspects of defense doctrine, and provides some recommendations. He devotes primary attention to three problems: What quantity of nuclear and conventional arms should we consider sufficient today; is there a need to transform Army and Navy structural development onto an intensive path; and, what should the Armed Forces of the USSR be in light of the new military doctrine.

A. Arbatov's proposals on the whole are well thought-out and supported by graphic examples from life. A more mobile, highly combat ready, well-trained army equipped with the latest equipment certainly corresponds to the new doctrine. The only question is: Will it be less expensive and will expenses for its maintenance and level of equipment be reduced? Today this must become the subject of careful and open analysis. Defense needs to be controlled by the society whose interests it serves and in this we are in total solidarity with the author.

However, a number of the article's provisions appear to us to be in error. "Far-reaching perestroika is occurring both in the economy and in the foreign policy of the USSR," writes A.G. Arbatov, "military policy must not impede these processes but must be actively involved in them." There is already an obvious inaccuracy in this thesis. For some reason, the author sees the content of perestroika of the armed forces first of all in changing the mechanism of military policy: "...perestroika in the armed forces is first of all perestroika of the mechanism of the elaboration and realization of military policy and military structural development" (p 34). Is it in fact like this?

Let us recall Article 32 of the Constitution of the USSR: "The State guarantees the country's security and defense capability and equips the Armed Forces of the USSR with everything necessary...." As we see, realization of A. Arbatov's proposals is beyond the jurisdiction of the

armed forces themselves. They certainly influence military policy being its primary instrument but this is a reverse linkage. Policy is precisely the determining [factor] with regard to the armed forces. In our view, we must change the places of the proposed formula's components. In contrast to the axioms of mathematics, its sense is substantially changed from this transposition. Attempts to attribute foreign policy and first of all diplomatic failures to the military seems to be at least not serious.

Later on the author appeals "to cast a fresh glance" at the narrow departmental approaches that have developed and to bring military theory and practice into stricter conformity with today's international political realities, having left the economy in parentheses as a topic for a separate conversation. Let us attempt to sort out just what, in A. Arbatov's opinion, this disparity is and what the novelty of his view is.

For example, he certifies: "The new approach to security requires us to recognize that a larger quantity of missiles, aircraft, tanks, and other weapons do not necessarily provide a more durable defense capability." This thought, although it is not "fresh," could lay at the foundation of subsequent discussions, however the author suddenly moves away from it. Further generalizations and conclusions begin to surprise more and more as he continues. "The convincing capability of massive retaliation is also our defense potential and the guarantee of security," writes Aleksey Georgiyevich and he adds: "until nuclear weapons are totally and completely destroyed via international agreements...." (p. 39). The world is structured on the fear of retaliation and this is the key thought that permeates A. Arbatov's entire article. He sees "a new approach" to the problem of defensive sufficiency in it.

Since the discussion on "nuclear winter" sounded on the pages of magazines, it has already become clear to everyone that the nuclear cudgel will punish both the just and the guilty regardless of the results of a retaliatory strike. Aleksey Georgiyevich persistently continues to restrain aggressors with the convincing capability of vengeance [otmshcheniye]. Even the naked eye can see that this product of a "fresh view" is covered with many years growth of mold.

One can detect other no less original thoughts in the article: "Strategic and military technical reality is currently such that it is absolutely impossible to reduce our own damage in a nuclear war by destroying the aggressor's strategic forces...." As we see, here the author examines an exclusively preventive strike and suddenly (suddenly in the military department someone forgot) warns: "...This is neither politically (in light of our obligation on no first use of nuclear weapons) nor technically acceptable." Afterward, the conclusion follows: "Destruction of American strategic nuclear weapons via a retaliatory strike is also obviously strategic nonsense." In other words, the author recommends not to fire anything there where there is already nothing.

It is hard to imagine that no one has figured this out by now but let us assume that the author doubts the quickwittedness of some representatives of the military department. Just what is the novelty of the approach where there is a disparity of military practice with today's realities?

There is no analysis and there cannot be any because "from the point of view of reasonable sufficiency" dear Aleksey Georgiyevich unfortunately sees only targets for a retaliatory strike at the same time that all mankind dreams about peace free from nuclear weapons. It is too bad that we have to remind an expert in the sphere of international relations about this.

In our ("narrow departmental") view, the novelty of the approach must consist of the fact that we must consider any sufficiency of nuclear weapons and security of peoples as absolutely incompatible concepts. And not destruction of American strategic offensive arms but nuclear war itself is both strategic and political nonsense. We are convinced that the experts in Washington understand this just as well as we do. Sufficiency of nuclear weapons must be only one—"absolute zero."

And finally, in our opinion, a transition to international relations based on renunciation of the use of force must become the main thing. Skeptics may smile but we will remind them that ten years ago no one thought about the destruction of nuclear weapons and today this is an historical fact.

We recall this thought of V.I. Lenin: "...not only transient, lively, and fluid phenomena are separated by just arbitrary limits but also the essence of things also are...." (Complete Collected Works, Vol 29, p 227). Regarding armed combat, let us assume that a radical change in the essence of war is linked with its disappearance from the life of the world community. The prospect of catastrophe as a result of nuclear attacks has compelled mankind to perceive itself as a single whole, to see global interrelations and interdependence, and was the impetus for the emergence of the new political thinking.

It is impossible to agree with the author of the article: We are at just the beginning of the *perestroika* of strategy, operational plans, the structure of the armed forces, etc. But really do discussions about things that are clear to everyone promote this process? Of course not. To base current international relations on mutual fear is a step into the past.

The author's thoughts on the expenditure approach to defense are certainly interesting. It is too bad that they have been set forth only in general terms. The topic is quite timely. For example, while comparing nuclear missile submarines, the author imparts a preference for platforms with fewer missiles. In his opinion, we can guarantee the survivability of the missile submarine fleet under a limit on warheads by increasing the number of platforms. However, many platforms is not the cheapest variant. "In unit costs, SSBN's are the most expensive strategic offensive weapon system," Aleksey

Georgiyevich himself asserts. Yes and survivability of the nuclear missile fleet depends on many factors and the number of platforms is not nearly the primary one.

In our view, "vengeance" and "guaranteed destruction" are not the starting point where we should begin. Betting on retaliation is a dead end. In our opinion, the following could be the points of departure for analysis of defensive, and afterward also reasonable, sufficiency.

First: Today not one state of the world is planning to unleash a world nuclear or conventional war because political or other goals do not exist that make sense to begin one. Otherwise all discussions about sufficiency in the sphere of defense do not mean anything. Nevertheless, while powerful opposing armed forces formations exist, the threat of their use in conflict situations remains.

Second: Distrust between East and West is based on the potential capability of surprise military operations as a result of which the victim will find itself in an extremely unfavorable position. Having taken these premises as a foundation, we will submit the political and military technical aspects of defensive sufficiency to further analysis.

In accordance with the first, war may be the result of an unexpected and drastic worsening of the military political situation in the world or escalation of regional conflicts. Then its threat is removed by reducing regional tension, by predicting probable conflict situations, and by developing proposals to solve them before they arise. We know that an intelligent man seeks and finds a way out of any most complicated situation but a wise man never finds himself in that situation. Today all of us need to acquire wisdom.

In the military technical sphere, we can reduce the threat of war by significantly reducing the quantity and combat capabilities of offensive weapons and by imparting a graphically expressed defensive direction to the operational-strategic structure of armed forces formations. After arms reduction and redisposition of troops, they must be simply incapable of a surprise attack and subsequent conduct of large-scale offensive operations.

In his article, A. Arbatov talks about the impossibility of a prolonged conventional war and, as a result, tasks the armed forces with this mission: Prevent an enemy victory in intensive short-term combat operations and prevent unpunished nuclear escalation. The strategy of nuclear restraint is once again masked under defensive sufficiency. Such discussions are completely in the spirit of those who do not wish to repudiate the strategy of deterrence and who attempt to perpetuate nuclear weapons.

As for conventional war in Europe, we direct Aleksey Georgiyevich's attention to the opinion of "unbiased" (read Western) experts whom he turns to in questionable situations. In particular, they think that by the end of the 1990's NATO's armed forces will be capable of

achieving the goals of war without the use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction if, of course, the process of detente does not interfere with the realization of these plans. While knowing about our obligation to not use nuclear weapons first, conventional war appears to be a reality which must be considered.

Certainly the very presence of nuclear weapons and also "dangerous" targets on the territory of the hostile parties whose destruction could result in unpredictable consequences will impact the course of a conventional war, its goals and missions, and forms and techniques of conducting combat operations. But this does not at all signify that it is impossible as such or will not necessarily escalate into a nuclear war. For example, although the opposing sides had impressive arsenals of chemical and bacteriological weapons during the Second World War, they also were not used on a significant scale.

Obviously, in the event of an attack the mission of our armed forces will be to stop an aggressor's offensive and "to pulverize" his primary strike formations and, having regained the lost position during subsequent counterattack operations, thereby to compel the enemy to cease combat operations and to sit at the negotiating table. But how much time is needed for this "pulverization"? A lot, considering that NATO's combined armed forces in Europe will be constantly resupplied from across the ocean. It is also easy to suggest that our industry will be under the opposing side's constant pressure while United States territory will remain untouched. Accordingly, the outcome of the armed struggle will in many ways depend on the reliability and adequacy of supplying the troops with everything necessary. Can we not attempt to disrupt the Atlantic sea lines of communication—the primary artery which feeds NATO troops in Europe under these conditions? Certainly not. Let us say a bit more: If we do not succeed in disrupting or seriously weakening transport movements in the Atlantic, war will assume a prolonged nature.

When A. Arbatov places under doubt the advisability of disrupting "sea lines of communication" and advances the capability of ground and air forces to reliably provide defense on the main continental theaters as the main argument, he is basing it on peacetime armed forces formations. But they are maintained only during the initial period of war and in the future economic potential, mobilization capabilities, etc. are the top priority. It is irresponsible to radically change the missions and structure of the armed forces without taking this into consideration. And we must not forget that formation of the country's mobilized reserves occurs by using people who have performed compulsory service in the Armed Forces.

Today it is increasingly clear: What a state's military might should be according to its purpose and nature is the key issue. The only thing that can cause disputes is: What minimum do we need to reach? For example, in the theses "On the Inability To Attack," A. von Byulov (See KOMMUNIST, 1989, No 7) proposes a specific arms reduction plan. The fact is that it is not perfect and

that it does not reflect the opinion of the NATO bloc leadership and it is important that it does not discuss the might of a retaliatory strike but ways to achieve reasonable sufficiency in the area of defense. This is the difference in the approaches between the old and new political thinking.

And finally. Some practical recommendations with which the article abounds cause doubt: How and where to inflict strikes and where it is better to defeat enemy armed forces, etc., the author often "discovers" these obvious truths that cause experts to smile. Well, how else can one relate to an appeal to refuse to look for U.S. Navy missile submarines near the coasts of New Guinea and Uruguay and the suggestion to "play on our own field"?

Or let us take Aleksey Georgiyevich's arguments about the uselessness of the air defense system. In this regard, let us recall just one well known historical fact. With the beginning of the Second World War, Great Britain was faced with the acute problem of defending sea convoys from fascist air attacks. Mathematicians were tasked to determine the advisability of installing antiaircraft artillery systems on merchant vessels. The scholars, having taken the mathematical expectation of the number of aircraft shot down as the primary criteria, obtained a quite low rate of effectiveness. They decided not to install antiaircraft weapons. Losses continued to increase and they nevertheless resorted to antiaircraft artillery: The number of ships sunk drastically decreased. The scholars' error consisted in erroneous selection of criteria. Instead of it, they should have taken the mathematical expectation of the fraction of damage prevented (ships saved). We have provided this example in order to illustrate how carefully and skillfully we need to approach problems of armed combat in general and air defense in particular.

We cannot agree with the proposal to review plans for construction of a major surface fleet, including "aircraft carrying ships." The idea is not new, they had already attempted to implement it in the 1960's and today military experts are racking their brains over how, without ships of this class, "to successfully play on their own field." The cursory glance of an "expert on strategic problems" is inadequate to resolve these serious problems and well-thought out analysis is needed based on a long-term political prognosis.

We would not like this article to be perceived as a personal attack against Aleksey Georgiyevich Arbatov whom we respect. We are only discussing his views. Having foreseen possible charges of a sort of pacifism, let us recall that the backbreaking burden lies precisely on the military—to plan retaliatory strikes while comparing the measure of responsibility for today's fate of the Homeland with the moral duty to succeeding generations who simply may not be born. Therefore, we are attempting not to scatter megatons on the pages of the periodical press but to manifest more good will and constructiveness.

**Numbers of Cases of 'Dedovshchina'**

90SV0033E Moscow *VETERAN* in Russian No 36, 3-6 Sep 90 p 15

[Letter to the editors and response in the column: "In the Light of Glasnost—Questions and Answers"]

[Text] 'Dedovshchina' in the Army is one of the most common military crimes. How many cases are there?

[Signed] K. Malyavskaya, Livny, Orel Oblast

The Directorate of Military Tribunals, in response to our request, has provided the following answer to the above question.

Last year 1,990 men were sentenced for commission of this crime. The highest number of cases of "dedovshchina"—"nonregulation interrelationships" in our parlance—occurred in 1985, amounting to approximately 4,000 convictions. Some of the persons so charged were put on probation, but 1,393 of those found guilty were sentenced to disciplinary battalions and 334 to corrective labor camps.

**Opinions on Proposed Military Disciplinary Courts**

90SV0033D Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian 7 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[Discussion: "The Disciplinary Court: Pros and Cons"; first four paragraphs are *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* introduction and a letter from Yu. Golik, chairman, Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Problems of Law and Order and Struggle Against Crime]

[Text] The editorial office of *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* is in receipt of a letter from the Committee of the USSR Supreme Court on Problems of Law and Order and Struggle Against Crime. A quote follows.

The committee receives a large number of letters written on the subject of crime in the Armed Forces. Some of the letters are from servicemen offering suggestions for strengthening of discipline. One of the letters was written by Major D. Pervukhin, a deputy battalion commander for political affairs, who proposes draft *Regulations on Disciplinary Courts in the USSR Armed Forces*.

The proposal merits consideration, in our view. However, the committee members must receive input of other opinions, particularly those of servicemen, before the committee takes any initiative action relative to this issue.

Yu. Golik  
Committee Chairman

The following comments are by the author of the suggestion to set up disciplinary courts and by his critics, who are military jurists.

**A Necessary and Urgent Measure**

There is widespread concern in society relative to the state of military discipline, particularly as it applies to

conscripted personnel. There is valid justification for that. It is a fact that the Army and Navy receive thousands of draftees who possess a criminal record. How many persons are there that commit a violation before being drafted, escape just punishment, suffer a mere passing scare, and continue on their way without any thought of guilt? There is a reason for the increasing incidence of crime in the Armed Forces.

However, that is only the tip of the iceberg, in the opinion of many persons, since commanders—in spite of strict orders to the contrary—still have no interest whatsoever in bringing the true extent of violations to light in an attempt to deal with what to them is an unpleasant situation. That is why work related to strengthening of discipline has proven ineffective. What is the solution?

I believe that it is necessary to take action in two areas. First, we must expand the privileges of conscientious soldiers. Examples of this could be shortening the term of service by 6 months (in the case of men serving on hardship posts, as a start); offering guaranteed leaves; permitting free time after the close of duty hours until taps; authorizing platoon leaders to grant passes of one day, company commanders two days, and battalion commanders up to three days. Second, we must work toward holding persons who violate discipline incontrovertibly responsible for their actions.

I would like to dwell on the second area of interest, particularly enforcement measures that can be applied to effect and maintain military discipline. It seems to me that in our system of military law there is a wide contrast between disciplinary liability and criminal liability; between enforcement measures within the framework of authority granted commanders by disciplinary regulations and measures of a criminal nature.

In this connection, I have learned by reading the literature that this kind of contrast was eliminated in the Russian Army by the use of regimental courts. They were originated as far back as the time of Peter the Great, but they then were the usual military courts. Starting in 1863 they began to hear only minor criminal cases, while more serious cases were handled by military district courts. The regimental courts were set up in every large unit (in the Navy they were known as "crew courts"); personnel assigned to small units were served by the closest regimental court. The court makeup was decided by the commander; it usually consisted of three officers.

An example of the courts' authority was the relegation of a soldier to the "penalized" status for periods up to a year as punishment for "incorrigible misbehavior." This imposed certain restrictions on the guilty, such as demotion from NCO rank and reduction in pay. The decision was subject to review by the regimental commander. In addition, the court was authorized to sentence the violator to a disciplinary unit for periods of one year to three years. In this case the court's decision would be reviewed by a military procurator.

Regimental courts continued to exist until after the February Revolution; they continued to function in the Red Army during the Civil War. This kind of court is still found in foreign armies, the U. S. Army being an example.

I believe that there is an advantage to utilize this experience, of course with modifications dictated by present day conditions. This is what gave rise to writing the draft Regulations on Disciplinary Courts. I propose that the courts be set up in regiments and equivalent units to hear cases of disciplinary infractions committed by soldiers, seamen, NCOs and warrant officers in compulsory service and servicemen of the abovementioned categories called up from the reserve for active duty training or muster.

The court would consist of five to 11 officers, warrant officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel in compulsory service, serving in this capacity a period of one year. The chairman would be an officer. The court would be invested with the authority to find conscripted personnel guilty of malicious violation of military discipline, a judgement that would be associated with the imposition of restrictions which could include loss of leave privileges, suspension of assignment to especially important posts, retention in arrest status for periods up to one month (a regimental commander has the authority to order this), and receipt of a pass not more than once a month. Other restrictions would be possible, such as exclusion of time spent in arrest status (up to four months) from length of service calculations. The court's decision would be subject to review by the regimental commander.

I would assume that the court would possess the authority to retain a malicious offender in arrest status for periods up to 2 months or sentence him to a disciplinary unit for periods of 2 to 6 months. In this case, the sentence would be subject to review by a military procurator and military tribunal chairman. However, there could be a simplified temporary remedy, one short of criminal punishments. There is an advantage to adopting it as soon as possible, with the question of authority expansion to be studied later.

General supervision over the disciplinary court would be the function of the unit commander, while the organizational aspect would be the responsibility of the post military tribunal chairman. In the event the court and unit commander experience a difference of opinion, a decision would be made by the chairman or judge of the military tribunal.

These courts could eventually acquire sufficient experience to hear cases of disciplinary infractions committed by officers, warrant officers, and cadets, of course after introducing the necessary modifications.

The draft regulations do require input from professional jurists, of course. However, I believe that this matter must not be delayed.

I am certain that my proposal can promote the principles of social justice. I look forward to receiving support from people's deputies and from all persons who hold the authority of the Armed Forces dear to their heart.

Major D. Pervukhin

#### A Step Backward

Major D. Pervukhin's proposal to organize disciplinary courts in the USSR Armed Forces is not only unnecessary but in addition unacceptable, for a number of reasons, chief of which are the following.

The implementation of Major Pervukhin's proposal would amount to a step backward relative to the furtherance of enforcement of criminal law, this as it applies to persons guilty not of commission of a crime but rather of disciplinary or administrative misdemeanors. This is patently contrary to the principles of criminal law policy of the Soviet Government and democratization processes.

I must also mention that the introduction of this kind of court would constitute a contradiction of Article 151 of the USSR Constitution, which stipulates that justice can be effected in the Armed Forces only by military tribunals, which are an integral part of the unified judicial system of the USSR. The Constitution makes no provision for other judicial structures for the Army and Navy.

In addition, the organization of disciplinary courts as proposed by Major Pervukhin essentially delivers into the hands of command authorities a new organ of repression, one endowed with the power to detain a person in arrest status for extended periods of time (up to two months) and authorizes the criminal punishment of sentencing the guilty to serve in a disciplinary battalion. This would undoubtedly give rise to gross violation of rights and legal interests of servicemen and would pave the way for arbitrariness.

In addition, the introduction of disciplinary courts would generate serious problems of carrying out court-imposed decisions related to arrest or assignment to a disciplinary unit. Existing disciplinary battalions cannot accept any significant number of persons, since this would adversely affect the present situation. Another consequence would be a requirement for additional funding (which would be substantial) to expand the system of disciplinary units.

We are of the opinion that attempts to resolve the problem of enhancing military discipline in the Army and Navy should be made not by creating new organs of repression and expanding the system of places for confining service personnel and military builders, but rather by requiring command authorities to apply a combination of acquainting personnel with the law and enforcement of law within the framework of authority granted by military regulations.

There is no doubt that the time has come to put an end to the practice of assessing the state of military discipline

on the basis of the number of persons found guilty and punished for disciplinary infractions. This practice—long censured by regulations—is still widespread.

A. Muranov  
Lieutenant General of Justice  
Chief, Military Tribunal Directorate

#### Not a Guarantee of Justice

The concept of setting up in the USSR Armed Forces courts that would hear cases of disciplinary infractions committed by conscripted servicemen is not new.

The draft regulations proposed by Major D. Pervukhin are associated with a number of serious shortcomings, due largely to the confused mix of norms from various branches of the law. Many should be governed by normative acts such as the Law on Defense of the USSR, Law on Status of Servicemen, the Regulations on the Responsibility of the Various Categories of Servicemen, and others.

For example, it is proposed that disciplinary courts be empowered to apply criminal law enforcement measures: confinement of violators in a stockade for periods up to 2 months and sentencing to a disciplinary battalion. This would amount to cancelling the difference between commission of a disciplinary infraction as opposed to a crime.

Although the draft does honor the principle of independence of the disciplinary court, no provision is made to differentiate between the functions of command authorities and those of the court. Endowing the unit commander with the authority to review decisions rendered by a disciplinary court, with the additional authority to change or cancel a decision or refer the matter to the same court for retrial deprives a judicial decision of independent merit. It is necessary to take into account the service relationship between the court members and their commander and that between the accused and the victim on the one hand and the court members on the other, a factor that undoubtedly can influence the fairness and objectivity of whatever finding may be declared.

It is our opinion that the organization of disciplinary courts as proposed by Major Pervukhin will do nothing to advance the strengthening of law and order and legality in the Army, since they cannot assume the observance of procedural guarantees provided for by the law as far as criminal law enforcement is concerned. This would also give rise to violation of the principle of equality of citizens before the court. In this case, what remains would be reduced to submitting to those courts only those cases that would no longer be of interest to investigative organs and the original court for the purpose of effecting social action measures, a situation that is already provided for by the existing Regulations on Comrades' Courts.

The author's proposal to charge military tribunals with the responsibility of the organization and supervision of

the activity and decision-rendering process of disciplinary courts, with the post military tribunal chairman to be responsible for sole review of disciplinary courts' decisions relative to sentencing to a disciplinary battalion or stockade also cannot be considered to have merit. The point here is that in this kind of situation military tribunals would actually be seconding the judgement rendered by disciplinary courts, meaning that they would be required to actually carry their responsibility, something that is completely unjustified from both the point of view of both procedure and common sense.

In addition, military tribunals would be required to virtually interfere with the activity of command authorities and even to supplant the latter at times. This would contradict the principles guiding judicial organs.

The author is unconvincing in his argument that the introduction of disciplinary courts would relieve command authorities of the need to conceal incidents of discipline violation. However, the fact remains that concealment is resorted to not to protect a soldier from a military tribunal, but as an attempt to create an illusion of a satisfactory state of military discipline.

With regard to organization, procedural questions, and jurisdiction of disciplinary (comrades') courts, we believe that it is advantageous to begin by referring to the existing Regulations on Comrades' Courts and introducing into the latter the necessary modifications and additions. Thus, this could include the consideration of suggestions for incorporating a number of restrictions that could be imposed upon violators of military discipline and for endowing this kind of court with the authority to hear property arguments on the part of conscripted service personnel, with the court possessing the authority of a court of arbitration.

I might add that the draft provisions to ignore time lost due to confinement to a stockade and reduce amounts of benefits and other payments can be taken into consideration in the development of the new Armed Forces Regulations and other acts of legislation that relate to military service.

N. Petukhov  
Lieutenant General of Justice  
Chairman, Military Collegium, USSR  
Supreme Court

#### Discussion of Career of Chief of 'Space Units'

90SV0033A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Sep 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by Colonel M. Rebrov: "Subject to Special Order: Chief of USSR Ministry of Defense Space Units Discusses Career"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Let me start off with a brief description of the person I wish to discuss: Vladimir Leontyevich Ivanov, Colonel General, holder of three orders and many medals. He was born in 1936 into a worker's family

living in the town of Kamenka-Dneprovskaya. He possesses a higher military education. Served in various districts. Married. Two children. More details follow.

A person's fate is similar to a river flowing in a winding channel, with its rapids and obstacles. At times it speeds up, other times it slows down, but it always continues forward in its determined rush. Anything can happen along the way: large and small conflicts that may be resolved easily or with difficulty, large and small joys that a person remembers for a long time. And dreams.

Each person's past experiences probably include events that determine his life from that time onward. Such an event was Midshipman Vladimir Ivanov's assignment to Leningrad-300. The assignment was unexpected and a mystery, but it did have some kind of logic that was dictated by the times. This happened to take place in 1958, when he was graduating from the Caspian Higher Naval School imeni S. M. Kirov, upon completion of his studies in the Mine and Torpedo Division. He had visions of wearing his golden lieutenant's shoulderboards and dreamed of serving in the Northern Fleet. Then came the order: Assignments of graduates to fleets and flotillas were to be held in abeyance pending issuance of a special order.

"Issuance of a special order," said Vladimir Leontyevich, with a slight smile. "How many times have I heard that! I cannot remember them all."

However, we will talk about that later. For now we will take up matters of today, of the earth and space.

The person in front of me possessed sharp facial features, and thick, wavy hair. His movements were swift and precise, hinting at his indomitable character. His hands were strong, his build thick-set and solid. He looked at me in a fixed, penetrating manner. Later his gaze became more relaxed, his conversational tone softer and rapid.

As he spoke there was a uniqueness, which at times became almost remote and complex, but not borrowed. It was largely his manner of speaking. Between the lines as he spoke there were bitterness, hope, an undeniable flavor of the Navy, the aroma of the sea, and the indispensable irony without which a storyteller in a ship's cabin would suffer a silent but certain incredulity. However, that is merely some background information. I learned something else about him from those who know him: The commander is tactful, but strict.

It is said that a chief of space units has a thousand things on his mind. That is true. Who among us will not agree with that? Which concern takes precedence? There is no disagreement on this score. The main and most difficult job is dealing with people. And there are tens of thousands of them, from private to general, from recruit to a highly skilled specialist. Then there are the venerable scientists: professors, doctors of science, candidates. What about the units proper? Their structure and nature? Let me tell you about that. Under the direction of Colonel General Ivanov are the space facilities

Baykonur and Plesetsk; subunits of testers; a command measurement complex; a scientific research institute; a VUZ; that which in military language is called an arsenal; military acceptance; and the diverse and complex space technology that resolves problems of the country's defense.

Let me add that these subunits are equipped with automatic control and guidance systems; computation complexes; high-speed computers that carry out tens of millions of operations a second and possess substantial memory; and electronic systems of great power and extreme sensitivity.

They track spacecraft flying in orbit, receive and process enormous amounts of operational data. They launch various kinds of satellites belonging to various departments, manned and unmanned craft, orbiting and interplanetary stations.

What about the person who heads all of this? A person is not chosen for this post on the basis of color of his eyes. Once more I refer to the official description: "Highly experienced and deeply erudite, thus providing a basis for..."

There is much in his character that he has molded himself. At the same time, he does not seem to be indebted for anything to anyone, if one is to judge from the formal point of view. However, he does possess a definite and precise awareness that much in his characteristics, personality, and outlook derives from interesting and original people whom he has had the good fortune to meet. He reminisced about grandfather Yermolay, schoolteacher A. I. Babeshko, the legendary mineman Captain 1st Rank G. N. Okhrimenko, rocket Army Commander General I. A. Shevtsov.

And life. He recalled his prewar years spent wandering in distant parts. His father served in the Navy. Later came the Maritime District and Mongolia, where his father worked as a mechanic at an MTS [machine-tractor station], later in repair shops. Then a return to Kamenka in April of 1941. Suddenly the war broke out. His father became a manager of a small plant, later, commander of a hunter battalion. That which could not be evacuated while the Hitlerites were making their rapid advance was blown up.

A column of refugees, both on foot and riding in carts; Rostov, Bataysk, Stalingrad; digging trenches at the city on the Volga; a short stay in Aktyubinsk. Then, the return home, literally on the "tail" of the advancing troops. They found that their hut had survived the fire by some miracle. It was the only hut left standing in the devastated area. The polizei, who lived in it during the occupation, did not have time to burn it.

In 1942 the family received a notification of the death of his father.

"What do you want to become when you grow up, Volodka?" he was asked by his classmates as they were graduating from school.

"A sailor," he answered.

"More interesting to be a pilot."

"No, a sailor. Like my father."

Then came a tour of duty in the Northern Fleet, as commander of a torpedo boat. His future service and career were taking definite shape when the Baku school received an instruction that included the phrase "pending issuance of a special order." "Dry land soldiers" from Moscow spoke to each graduate individually. Ivanov's interview was brief: "You are familiar with the design of torpedoes, therefore you will get to know missiles just as well."

It was then that he saw the address "Leningrad-300" in the assignment order. Where was it? What was it? No one knew much about it. Later came additional information: Plesetsk Station. That still did not clear the matter up as to where and what it was. He received 6 months of retraining in Rostov in July of 1959, after which he was assigned to Baykonur. His activity was monitored by prominent rocket tester Colonel Nosov, who readied the launches of Korolev and Yangel vehicles and acquainted novices with the famous "No 7" (R-7). He observed the first launches of rockets flying to the moon. His position was crew chief for ground testing of electrical equipment for ancillary units.

Subsequently, there was the same river of fate: deputy commander of a unit stationed at Plesetsk; studies in the Military Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy; deputy commander of a missile regiment; commander of a missile combined unit; deputy commander of a rocket army; finally, assignment to the then secret Plesetsk, the place where he had served as a lieutenant.

He was a tester, able to do any job. Filed in his tenacious memory were the names of hundreds of persons, their faces, personalities, mannerisms, and habits. His mind was able to accommodate all of this. Then a particular day came along. No, why call that just a day. In the last few years that time has assumed a great significance in his life. It was quite a fateful day, one that he can never forget. The date was 18 March 1980. The "No 7" was being prepared for launch. Fuelling had been completed. All attachments to the launch pad had been disconnected. Suddenly, a fire broke out at the fourth unit. Then an explosion. The rocket was enveloped in flames. The flames, mixed with smoke and thunder, hid everything. People died.

A government commission arrived at Plesetsk, where Ivanov was chief of the launch facility.

The commission included L. V. Smirnov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; chief designers V. P. Glushko and V. P. Varmin; Commander V. F. Tolubko; N.

N. Alekseyev, deputy minister of defense for armaments; and General A. A. Maksimov.

There were various renditions as to what had occurred. Telemetry analysis, questioning of specialists, and examination of everything made it possible to "put the finger on" the cause: an oxygen leak. Ivanov did not take issue with the findings. Reflections on what had occurred led him to believe that the launch crew's work, which requires a high degree of attention and exact compliance with the instructions as written, became the victim of a careless attitude, resulting in the tragedy.

"Why mull over the past?" ask timid souls. In this connection, a remembrance of misfortunes overcomes only the weak; in the strong it develops courage and wisdom. This must be so. Nevertheless, how is it possible to comfort the friends and relatives of those who died? There are no words that can help mothers, fathers, wives, and children of those who burned to death in that crackling hell. Ivanov decided to take a desperate step. His heart told him that half-truths in this kind of situation are worse than any reticence, subterfuge, or lie. He saw fit to take relatives to the place of tragedy, show them the launch complex and the MIK [assembly and test building], and tell them about the "No 7" and all phases of launch preparation. "Many people do not know what kind of work we do, and rumors abound," he said, explaining his decision.

The commissions findings resulted in an action. A document castigating the chief of the launch facility was signed by L. I. Brezhnev and A. N. Kosygin. Although specific persons were cited as guilty, the chief of the launch facility bore the major part of the guilt. He was to be denied further promotion in the absence of a special order. It was only at this high level that punishment could be imposed.

It is said that misfortunes never come singly. It is also said that rumors fly on wings. They went as far as Kamenka. Someone said to his mother: "Your Volodka is to be tried in court for letting people die." This was enough to break her motherly heart. After being told such a terrible thing about her son, Lyubov Nikolayevna was shaken to the core. Within a day she was dead.

He recalled all this while looking me straight in my eyes, but at the same time he was somehow looking within himself, slowly weighing each word. I felt his pain and quickly changed the subject. "You also said that joys are also long remembered. Let us talk about them."

"I served in many places, but the main events occurred in Plesetsk, I should say. Eternity and life have come together in these ancient Russian places. The town is now called Mirnyy. This also has its own symbolism, its own meaning. I often have occasion to spend some time there.

"Joys. In 1965 fall arrived early in Mirnyy. The month was August, but the weather was chilly and damp, the sky was dark, and the rain refused to stop. A messenger,

drenched, came running: 'Comrade Captain, you have a son!' I did not know what to do next. I rushed to see the commander, I told him this and that. He then said, 'Take the gazik and go!' I was not permitted to enter the maternity home. I was shown a 'bundle' through the window - my Lenka - so named after his sailor grandfather."

Life. Today there are two sons growing up in the Ivanov family. To be more exact, they are not just growing up: They are already grown. It seems that the dynasty of the Red Commanders is continuing. The officer's shoulderboards of the elder one bear three small stars; the younger one - Vadim - is still a cadet at a military school in Riga. The father is very desirous of their becoming persons of integrity; ones who will not bring disgrace on the family, lose their sense of honor, or become done in by these difficult and contradictory times.

We again took up the topic of the space units and the very special technology they employ. A new space facility is to be accepted. A multitude of problems must be resolved in close collaboration with chief and general designers, industry, and scientists. The experience he gained as chairman of the state commission is especially helpful when one difficulty follows another. Yes, problems do come up, and they must be dealt with. When disagreements arise relative to the amount of time required for technological work, developers tend to cite a larger amount. "They never have enough. But time means people, too!" said Vladimir Leontyevich, using navy language in his referring to the number of persons necessary to "stand the watch."

**When General K. A. Kerimov was overtaken by illness during the launch of Soyuz TM-10, Ivanov took charge of the state commission. Everything went very smoothly, although there were trouble spots. The launch was manned. Incidentally, Vladimir Leontyevich does not believe that space work is divisible into important and unimportant aspects.**

"Well, what plans do you have for the immediate future?" I asked, while experiencing the feeling that at that point I was taking up too much of his time.

"I am preparing to tear myself away from my duties and take a leave," he said, adding: "The minister has approved my request for leave, but with a warning: 'This is subject to your receipt of a special order'"

#### GlavPUR Psy-Op Units Noted

91UM0037A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
12 Oct 90 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Maj Gen (Ret) Mikhail Ivanovich Burtsev by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col O. Nikonov: "Special Propaganda Without Secrets"]

[Excerpts]

[Nikonov] Mikhail Ivanovich, in introducing you to the readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, I would like to

explain right off the reason for this conversation. The fiftieth anniversary of the organization of special formations in the political units of the Red Army is coming up, formations which have used just one weapon—and a very humane one—against the enemy: the weapon of the word. These subunits had just as humane a goal in any confrontation—reduce human losses both on their own side and the enemy's by convincing him to lay down his arms and not resist. And you are one of the oldest members of this service, are you not? And the first question I have for you, naturally, is where did special propaganda get its start?

[Burtsev] Special propaganda as an independent service in the structure of the armed forces was formed not long before the start of the Great Patriotic War, although, it must be said that morale and political influence on the front and rear areas of hostile armies had been waged quite actively from the very first days of the birth of the Red Army. [passage omitted]

[Nikonov] Mikhail Ivanovich, what moral idea is inherent in the combat mission of this service?

[Burtsev] To elicit a negative attitude toward imperialist warfare and protest against their own government among the soldiers and population of an enemy country, and to win their sympathy toward the Red Army and the Soviet people. This was the fight against fascist ideology... [passage omitted]

[Nikonov] Doesn't the situation in the world today, the absence of a sharp confrontation of military and political forces, impel the political units toward fundamentally new solutions to the problems of special propaganda? The times are such—the country is reforming...

[Burtsev] That question is a natural one and cannot arouse indignation. Much really is changing in the world. Our military doctrine has changed as well, and reformation is underway in the structures of the armed forces and the political bodies of the army and navy. Special propaganda naturally has other aims and missions today: elucidating the exclusively defensive nature of the Soviet armed forces through foreign political and military channels, and arranging and reinforcing contacts and collaboration with foreign armies. Friendly visits by military delegations are becoming more and more frequent today, and this is the result of working in the new manner and under the new conditions. So we must study foreign countries and armies for the purpose of developing genuinely civilized relations. Otherwise we will have darkness and false impressions of ourselves and our capabilities. Isn't that so?

[Nikonov] I agree with you. Thank you for the discussion.

**Kamchatka Oblast Asserts Control Over Military Land**

91UM00053A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 19 Oct 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 2nd Rank M. Lukyanin in the "Soviets and Garrisons" column: "Bering Would Be Surprised"]

[Text] The presidium of the Kamchatka Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies recently passed a resolution entitled "Ownership and Use of Lands Lying Within Kamchatka Oblast and of Water Bodies Adjacent Thereto," which has served as the basis for its tasking the oblastpolkom with taking inventory of the lands by the end of the year, and also with developing rates of payments and collecting these payments for lease of the lands.

As reported by Captain 2nd Rank O. Zhamangarinov, who is chairman of the Oblast Soviet Committee on Affairs of Servicemen, included among parties subject to the levy are military units. Many deputies share the opinion that the Ministry of Defense enjoys an "excess of privilege" on the peninsula.

Commonly used as an example of the above are closed communities such as Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy-50, in which the local soviet cannot assign residents plots under a SOT [small garden association] arrangement due to the presence of adjacent restricted areas.

"This is a situation we did not expect," said garrison representative Colonel Yu. Buyanov in commenting on the oblast soviet's resolution. "I cannot understand what the legal basis can be for repeal of state legislation dealing with gratuitous allotment of lands that was passed years ago, legislation that was mandatorily coordinated with the local soviets. How do they intend to define the new boundaries of the properties? In addition, if payments are to be made, this must be done with money. It is common knowledge that in the military budget no provision is made for lease payments."

"I agree that the Ministry of Defense is a particularly significant presence on Kamchatka, particularly in the sense of land use," offered Captain 1st Rank L. Lopatskiy. "This is understandable, since the shores, the direct outlet to the ocean, the advanced post of the country's defense, are located in the zone of higher military activity. As a matter of fact, military settlements served as the starting point for winning of the peninsula. Who was Bering—the one who founded Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy? He was an officer in the Russian Navy. Who deserves credit for holding onto Kamchatka in the military campaign that was waged in the middle of the last century?

"A sentiment that has been popular is that the military should guard facilities, not land. Is that logical? Yes, if one is to think superficially. Let us take the case of a storage facility for missiles (a "military facility") that of and by itself occupies little space. However, a restricted area is set up around it, one in which SOTs—for one

thing—cannot be permitted. This determines the conditions affecting the location. There can be no other way to do this."

I will cite another example, which the Kamchatka legislators would do well to heed.

"We of course do attempt to cooperate with local organs of authority," remarked Admiral G. Khvatov, the Pacific Fleet commander, "but why must they act in such haste, without coordination, on the assumption that they are the only ones involved? We in the Navy intend in the near future to perform a kind of review of land assigned to us. This includes Kamchatka. Those lands for which no great need exists will be given up. We have already taken such action in the case of certain holdings on Sakhalin. Nevertheless, questions as serious as lease payments should be studied and resolved thoughtfully, with consideration of the general economic situation."

**Defense Spending Figures Given to UN**

91UM0088A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 45, Nov 90 pp 1, 2

[Unattributed article: "The Army: How Costly It Is for Us"]

[Text] Well, it came to pass! On 12 October, for the first time in Soviet history, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Petrovskiy sent UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar the "Document for Standardized International Accounting on Military Expenditures" for fiscal year 1989.

In other words, we finally declassified that which was senselessly kept secret for so long. The military budget in countries of "bourgeois democracy" has been a subject of open debates in the parliament and the press from time immemorial, and their defense did not suffer from this.

Well, we were openly sly in filling in figures in the "defense" column of the budget in past years. More precisely, we published only the amount of expenditures "for footcloths," i.e., for the Army's upkeep, without taking into account expenditures for arms procurement, scientific research and military construction, although it is possible simply that no one in the Soviet Union at that time knew how much money was going into the bottomless barrel under the name of "defense."

Then in 1987 M. S. Gorbachev promised that accurate figures would be published in the next two or three years, and now the promise has been kept.

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The table shown requires some explanation. There are no data in column 1 inasmuch as strategic forces do not have a clear-cut organization in the USSR, but are part of several branches of the Armed Forces. Column 5 gives data for the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Defense Forces and other combat forces not included in the Ground Forces, Navy or Air Force.

Column 6 gives data for logistic support of all branches of the Armed Forces, and column 7 gives data for command and control of the Armed Forces, including the apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Defense and support units.

Column 8 gives data for paramilitary forces, including USSR KGB Border Guard Troops, USSR MVD Internal Security Forces, and DOSAAF training centers.

Column 10 gives data on free military assistance to foreign states.

Unfortunately, the standard account which the Soviet government submitted to the UN does not contain information about the export of Soviet arms broken down by countries and regions, which the majority of UN member countries submit, but this probably is a matter for the future.

USSR Military Expenditures in 1989 (Millions of Rubles)

Items of Expenditure	Groups of Contingents					Central Logistic Support and Command and Control	
	Strategic Forces	Ground Forces	Navy	Air Force	Other Combat Forces	Support	Command and Control
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURES	...	9,950	2,737	2,226	2,540	2,506	121
Personnel	...	4,943	1,241	1,296	1,626	...	94
Draftees	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Other military personnel, including reserves	...	3,393	953	1,092	1,392	...	82
Civilian Personnel	...	1,550	288	204	234	...	12
Operational management	...	5,007	1,496	930	914	2,506	27
Operating supplies	...	2,824	450	144	229	1,632	6
Maintenance and repair	...	1,158	931	732	486	...	6
Acquisition of services	...	1,025	115	54	199	874	15
Lease of real estate	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Other expenditures	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
TECHNICAL OUTFITTING AND CONSTRUCTION	...	10,093	7,193	7,360	6,771	5,521	...
Technical outfitting	...	9,273	6,531	6,941	5,465	4,361	...
Aircraft and engines	...	...	210	1,845	949	...	...
Missiles, including conventional warheads	...	995	695	562	1,621	...	...
Nuclear warheads and bombs	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Ships and small combatants	...	...	2,993	...	...	...	...
Armored equipment	...	2,137	...	...	...	2	...
Artillery	...	418	12	...	...	...	...
Other arms of Ground Forces	...	819	...	...	...	36	...
Ammunition	...	2,256	487	757	...	...	...
Electronics and communications equipment	...	779	495	927	767	2,591	...
Nonarmored means of transportation	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Other	...	1,869	1,639	2,850	2,128	1,732	...
Construction	...	820	662	419	1,306	1,160	...
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	...	966	2,160	2,734	7,484	140	394
TOTAL:	...	21,009	12,090	12,320	16,795	8,167	515

## USSR Military Expenditures in 1989 (Millions of Rubles) (Continued)

Items of Expenditure	Military Assistance						General Military Expenditures	Civil Defense
	Paramilitary Forces	On National Territory	Abroad	UN Peace-keeping Operations	Undistributed Appropriations			
	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	
<b>OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURES</b>	1,1	13	-	...	...	2,239	23,432	114
<b>Personnel</b>	637	-	...	...	2,239	11,976	61	
Draftees	...	-	...	...	-	...	...	
Other military personnel, including reserves	336	-	...	...	2,239	9,487	...	
Civilian Personnel	201	-	...	...	-	2,489	61	
<b>Operational management</b>	576	...	•	...	-	11,456	57	
Operating supplies	268	-	...	...	-	5,553	14	
Maintenance and repair	252	-	...	...	-	3,565	...	
Acquisition of services	52	-	...	...	-	2,334	...	
Lease of real estate	...	...	...	...	-	...	...	
Other expenditures	4	-	...	...	-	4	39	
<b>TECHNICAL OUTFITTING AND CONSTRUCTION</b>	740	-	...	...	2,031	39,709	9	
<b>Technical outfitting</b>	637	-	...	...	2,031	35,239	...	
Aircraft and engines	94	-	...	...	-	3,098	...	
Missiles, including conventional warheads	...	-	...	...	-	3,873	...	
Nuclear warheads and bombs	...	-	...	...	2,031	2,031	...	
Ships and small combatants	205	-	...	...	-	3,198	...	
Armored equipment	30	-	...	...	-	2,169	...	
Artillery	1	-	...	...	-	431	...	
Other arms of Ground Forces	17	-	...	...	-	872	...	
<b>Ammunition</b>	30	1	...	...	3,530	...		
Electronics and communications equipment	185	-	...	...	-	5,744	...	
Nonarmored means of transportation	50	-	...	...	-	50	...	
Other	25	-	...	...	-	10,243	...	
<b>Construction</b>	103	-	...	...	-	4,470	9	
<b>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</b>	9	-	...	...	250	14,137	...	
<b>TOTAL:</b>	1,862	-	673	...	4,520	77,951	123	

### Performance, Features of T-72AK Tank

91UM0077A Moscow VOYENNOYE ZNANIYA  
in Russian No 9, Sep 90 pp 16-17

[Article by Col (Ret) V. Knyazkov under "Journal in a Journal" rubric: "The T-72AK Tank"]

[Text] It will not be an exaggeration to say that a present-day tank represents a many-ton steel fortress packed full of electronic and electromechanical systems, devices, instruments, mechanisms, subassemblies and hardware. All together they constitute an extremely complex but compact organism that performs a mass of diverse functions. Let us try to understand this complicated system.

Let us open one of the turret hatches, go down into the fighting compartment and install ourselves in the seat located to the right of the gun. This is the workplace of the tank commander, equipped with the latest science and technology. Before him here are advanced optical observation instruments, with the help of which the commander scouts the terrain day and night, indicates reference points and designates targets. There is a powerful radio station here (external communication). An intercom serves for internal communication with the crew members.

To the left of the gun is the gunner's seat. To be frank, this is a very important figure in the crew. He aims the gun and machinegun and squeezes the electric triggers. What kind of firepower is he entrusted with?

The basis of the tank's armament is a 125-mm smoothbore gun. This kind of caliber says a lot. It is sufficient to say that the range of a grazing shot in firing with a armor-piercing sabot projectile reaches 2,100 meters (!). And the day sight allows the gunner to choose targets in the broadest span of ranges up to the limit of 4 km. The infrared sight is just as worthy of praise. With its help, it is possible at night, in total darkness, to take a "bead" on an enemy target at a distance of 800 meters. The gun ammunition is also imposing: high explosive-fragmentation, armor-piercing and shaped-charge. For example, the weight of the high explosive-fragmentation projectile is 33 kg and beyond that there is the cartridge case with a propellant charge weighing almost 8 kg. The main parts of the artillery round are so heavy that the designers had to employ rapid-fire separate loading here: first the projectile is put into the loading chamber of the barrel and then the cartridge case.

Who performs these actions? Where is the loader? There is no such person. The crew is comprised of only three persons—the commander, the gunner and the driver. All operations in the feeding of the projectile and cartridge case from the battle stowage to the barrel are performed by an automatic loader—essentially a robot. It works measuredly, accurately and rapidly: the sustained rate of fire is eight rounds a minute.

The external aspect of the projectile attracts attention. The design of its rear part is unusual. The fact is that the

gun fires fin-stabilized projectiles. It is a matter of narrow metallic fins, the basis of the design of the projectile stabilizer. We remind you that it was pointed out above that the gun has a smooth bore. If we open the bolt and look inside the barrel, we will not see the rifling present in classic artillery systems through which the projectile turns relative to the longitudinal axis, thereby stabilizing its trajectory. The result is an increased range and accuracy of fire.

So why did the smoothbore gun appear in our time? The smooth barrel has several design advantages and it is simpler to manufacture. The problem of the stable flight of the projectile was resolved in the same way as for the mortar shell (a mortar barrel is likewise a smooth-walled tube) but the mortar does not tumble in its trajectory because it is equipped with a stabilizer. In the case of the 125-mm projectile, the stabilizer was made like an umbrella. It releases the "fan" of the fin assembly after leaving the bore. In addition, the tank gun is stabilized in two aiming planes—horizontal and vertical. These functions are performed by the stabilizer with the help of highly precise sensors and strong powered gyroscopes utilized as actuating mechanisms. The stabilizer "remembers" the aiming of the gun at the target and keeps it in this position regardless of the oscillations of the hull of the tank. As a result, firing can be done on the move without compulsory short stops.

The T-72AK has two machineguns. One is linked directly with the gun and they have common aiming mechanisms. This is a machinegun of Kalashnikov normal tank caliber (7.62 mm). It has a small sighting range of 1,800 meters, a rate of fire of up to 250 rounds a minute and belt feed with 250 cartridges in the belt. The other machinegun is an antiaircraft weapon of 12.7-mm caliber made on the basis of the "Utes" machinegun of the universal type. It can be used for fire not only against attacking aircraft and helicopters but also against ground targets. The rate of fire is 680 to 800 rounds a minute, the maximum range of aimed fire is 1,500 meters for air targets and up to 2,000 meters for ground targets.

Now let us spend some time in the workplace of the driver. Your eyes can hardly take in the multitude of instruments, switches, knobs and control sticks. This crew member serves a most important link in the automated system that moves the tank, the basis of which is a 780-horsepower diesel engine. He skillfully guides the 41-ton vehicle on highways, dirt roads, graded roads and impassable roads. Thanks to his skill, the tank overcomes different obstacles: ditches up to 2.8 meters in width, vertical walls 85 cm high and water obstacles of up to 1 km across and as deep as a two-story house (5 meters).

It can go a whole kilometer along a river bottom? Is such a thing possible? To go under water, the tank activates equipment for underwater driving. On the illustration [not included] to the right of the turret, one can clearly see its snorkel, through which air is supplied to the crew

and engine. But it is not enough to descend, it is also necessary to move. In such a case, the driver must have complete competence in the hydroscopic course indicator—a kind of compass that is located in front of it.

What can be said about other maneuvering characteristics of the T-72AK? For example, the average speed of movement on dirt roads is in the range of 35 to 45 km/hour and on highways it is 50 km/hour with a maximum of 60 km/hour. The range depending upon the operating mode varies between 320 and 480 km with a maximum (on a highway) of 500 km.

The eyes of all crew members are armed with day and night optics. The tanks no longer have view ports. Prism instruments have been installed, the upper part of which is above the surface of the armor, while the lower part is at eye level. If a fragment hits, the broken instrument can easily be replaced with a spare.

Night "vision" is more complex. Nature gave such a possibility to owls but man had to invent an image converter, which is the basis for any infrared instrument. It also includes a lens, an eyepiece and an infrared searchlight. The latter "compulsorily" irradiates the target with streams of invisible thermal energy and "forces" it to "shine." Part of the energy is reflected by the target and reaches the lens and then the image converter and its photoelectric cathode. The result is the transformation of the invisible infrared image of the

target into an invisible electronic image and then into a visible optical image. Hence the tank can see at night as well.

Attached to the turret of the T-72AK are devices for the launching of smoke grenades—five to the left and five to the right. A smoke screen can be used for camouflage. On the stern are two barrels with a reserve of fuel and under them is a log for the self-extraction of the vehicle.

The powerful armored hull of the tank protects all vitally important subassemblies of the vehicle and the crew and the upper part of its tracks is entirely covered with special protective screens against the effects of shaped charges. This is necessary to "deceive" shaped-charge rounds and to neutralize their action. When such a projectile hits the protective screen, it naturally is actuated, because it "does not know" the nature of the obstacle. It does not care whether it is massive armor or a thin steel screen. Here the calculation is simple: the shaped-charge jet of molten material "expires" on the screen and it no longer has enough power to penetrate the armor. The result is a strengthening of the protection of the sides.

Let us say frankly that Soviet designers were able to create a vehicle that is original in its combat qualities. In its design and in its firing and maneuvering possibilities, the tank T-72AK fully meets contemporary battle requirements.

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**Col Gen Shaposhnikov on Delayed Promotions**

*91UM0080A Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian  
3 Nov 90 First Edition p 2*

[Letter from Captain I. Krotov of the Western Group of Forces, published under the rubric: "Openly About What Hurts;" followed by commentary by Air Force Colonel General E.I. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Air Force and USSR deputy minister of defense—"Will He Never Be a Major?"]

[Text] He has fallen far behind his friends of the same age. At the age of 32 he became a captain, and has been such for five years now. Other people of his age are trying on the lieutenant colonel's shoulder boards for size.

However, it was he, Nikolay Kostenko—a flight commander, Air Force pilot first class—who recently became the subject of a military newsletter; it was he, Kostenko, whom Major L. Kokhanchuk, regiment party committee secretary, described as "an officer who enjoys high prestige and possesses marvelous human qualities."

"What kind of fairness can we talk about if even such people as Nikolay remain unnoticed?" was the frequent indignant question of his colleagues. I must add that the public's opinion of Kostenko fully coincides with the official one: Recently his commander and the political officer both signed a document evaluating the officer very highly.

Now Nikolay recollects more and more often the words from a song by Vladimir Vysotskiy about a captain who would never be a major.

Who has "wronged" the worthy officer?

Not the regiment command, in any case. It was his commanders who applied the relevant order of the USSR minister of defense and the regulations on officer military service in the USSR Armed Forces to ask that Kostenko be promoted to a military rank one step higher than the rank his present position calls for. Unfortunately, nothing came of it.

The letter came back from the division headquarters with no explanation of the denial provided. It bore the following inscription: "Return to the unit with no action taken on the commander's decision..." It was signed by the personnel office chief. Curiously enough, the column headed "Decisions of Immediate Commanders," which contained the approvals of his commander, regiment political officer, and the chief political officer of the combined unit, did not have any entry by Colonel I. Kokoulin, who theoretically had the last word. Igor Mikhaylovich did not say or write anything in explanation of his decision; even the regiment commander was not told anything. The only fact that could be learned from a telephone conversation with the personnel office was that the letter was sent back because Captain Kostenko had not flown a sufficient number of hours as a flight instructor.

How convincing is this argument? The appropriate documents on the order of officer military service in the USSR Armed Forces state: "Recommending an officer for the next rank... one level higher than his position calls for should be done as an encouragement, mostly in case of officers on combat duty..., flight commanders rated as Air Force pilots first class who have major achievements in military training, knowledge of new airplane technology, and discipline." There is no mention of any "sufficient" or "insufficient" flying time as a flight instructor. The letter of recommendation, by the way, did not say anything about Kostenko flying as an instructor. Where did this "insufficient" come from?

We can of course express our indignation, but we also need to understand something else: To a certain extent Colonel Kokoulin is in such a position himself that he has to look for more or less credible explanations for the rejections. Igor Mikhaylovich remembers quite well that recently several of the recommendations that he approved were sent back from "above." It goes without saying that all of them were signed "No action taken."

How can we explain all this? According to the personnel officer's opinion, the reason for all this lies in the military cutbacks. This is the "picture": If officers are now promoted as an "encouragement," it will become rather difficult to find positions for their higher ranks later, in the reduced Armed Forces.

Major V. Pozdnyakov, an Air Force personnel officer of the Western Group of Forces, cited the following data: As early as December of last year 20 letters recommending flight commanders for ranks one step higher than their present positions call for were sent to the Air Force personnel administration. None of them were approved. The explanation of the denial was rather simple: "Due to organizational measures concerning reductions in USSR Armed Forces personnel..."

Which means that people were attracted by an incentive, but that incentive was hidden straightaway—for the time being.

And another thing: Is it Nikolay Kostenko's fault that he, a hard-working officer and a good pilot, and many others like him live in such times that they cannot be given their well-earned new ranks?

[Signed] Captain I. Krotov, Western Group of Forces.

The editor asked Air Force Colonel General E.I. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Air Force and deputy minister of defense, to provide a commentary to this letter.

First of all I want to say that nobody in the USSR Ministry of Defense or the Air Force Main Command, or in the major air force commands, gave any orders not to recommend exceptional flight commanders for the next military rank one step higher than their present positions call for due to reductions in Armed Forces personnel.

Moreover, we understand how important it is to treat people with care and concern and to assess their work

objectively. Therefore, we lately intensified our practice of encouraging such people. To date, for instance, we have recommended for promotion some 26 percent more flight commanders than in 1984-1985, and 42 percent more than last year.

Some of the recommendations, an average of a hundred a year, are really sent back or are denied by the commanders themselves. The reason for this are the candidates themselves, and not bias shown by the commanders of the military councils considering them. Some of the candidates fall below the level required of a flight commander in the position of a teacher of young pilots.

Promoting an officer to the next rank, one step higher than his position calls for, is one way to encourage flight commanders who excel in their duties. We cannot allow any unreasonable sameness of approach in this or any "old buddy" treatment. Sometimes, however, we learn about instances in which commanders want to look like "good old boys" to their subordinates and therefore unscrupulously recommend for promotion anyone who has served in his position for a certain period of time.

Our position in this respect is very well defined. The results of one's flying, combat, and tactical skills, and one's ability to teach the full program to his subordinates, rather than the period of service, should serve as

the primary criterion. If the flight commander is not quite up to these standards, then we have to wait. But then his superiors, including the division commander, should talk to this pilot and explain to him why he cannot be recommended for promotion yet and suggest ways for improvement. I am sure that such a conversation, if it is conducted with good will and weighty reasons, would enhance the prestige of the commander and would provide a stimulus for the pilot in his combat training.

As for the situation described in this article, I requested that Air Force Lieutenant General Yu. Simakhin, head of the Air Force personnel administration, examine it in full detail. If any error has been committed he should immediately correct it. We are prepared to recommend to the USSR minister of defense every flight commander who is worthy of being given the next rank one step higher.

I think that the newspaper did the right thing in raising this issue. It is commendable that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is focusing specifically on problems of the social protection of our military. These problems are linked directly to the people's mood, to their attitude toward their duty, and that means they are linked to the combat preparedness of units and subunits.

**V-Adm Chernov on Implications of 'Komsomolets' Report**

90SV0050A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 9 Sep 90  
Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union Candidate of Naval Sciences Vice-Admiral Yevgeniy Dmitriyevich Chernov: "A Tragedy Makes a Claim"]

[Text] *IZVESTIYA* has referred repeatedly to a tragedy that occurred on 7 Apr 89 in the Norwegian Sea, where one of the best Soviet nuclear submarines, the *Komsomolets*, was lost. A governmental commission investigated the cause of the accident for a year and a half. Its conclusions were published the other day. A cause of the catastrophe such as crew error is officially acknowledged in it for perhaps the first time. What lies behind such a difficult admission?

We give the floor to Hero of the Soviet Union Candidate of Naval Sciences Vice Admiral Ye. Chernov

It was and is difficult for me to discuss this subject. Difficult because analysis of the reasons for the loss of the submarine, in my opinion, could unwillingly cast a shadow over the lost sailors.

I felt and do feel that all of the crew members of the *Komsomolets* acted courageously and staunchly in the emergency. There were not even individual manifestations of cowardice or inability to perform on the vessel. The sailors kept control to the last and perished with the dignity of people who had honorably fulfilled their soldier's and person's duty to the end...

But the tragedy is that personal courage and staunchness cannot replace skill and knowledge. And the whole truth of the *Komsomolets* tragedy is this: the crew that suffered the disaster—as opposed to the first, principal one—was not taught or trained to act in a complex, the more so critical, situation on such a special, essentially experimental, boat as the *Komsomolets*.

I had occasion, within the framework of the governmental commission, to take part in the investigation of many versions of the loss of the vessel, and especially in a study of the possible causes of the outbreak of fire. The technical aspects of the matter have been set forth more than once in the press, and there is no need to repeat them here. But there has been silence on an objective assessment of the actions of the crew.

The design drawbacks of the *Komsomolets* are characteristic of other boats as well. Yes, they could have been the cause of the initial ignition—a fire in a submarine, unfortunately, is not such a rarity—but they are, as a rule, always able to extinguish it using standard vessel equipment. They were not able to on the *Komsomolets*. Why?

Specialists and I tried to fill in the blanks that were seemingly not noticed by the representatives of the naval commander-in-chief. We prepared a document called

"Analysis of the Actions of the Personnel in Damage Control on the Submarine *Komsomolets* on 7 April 89 in the Norwegian Sea," presented to the naval command and the governmental commission. It stated directly that the ignition on the *Komsomolets* grew into a high-intensity fire similar to a flame in a gigantic blacksmith's forge not due to imperfections in the equipment, but rather due to errors in the actions of the crew: the sailors did not make use of the damage-control capabilities existing on the vessel, and deviated from the methods and rules envisaged for such an instance.

A conventional fire does not lead to the loss of watertightness in the pressure hull, as occurred on the boat, where almost the entire reserve of high-pressure air except the emergency reserve was released into the aft burning compartment.

But even that did not doom the boat to loss, as the naval commission members asserted. The crew had to fight the entry of outside water, keep the vessel on the surface and ensure its stability. The sailors had quite a bit of time and opportunity for that. Unfortunately they did not know how to recognize how the emergency situation develops and what it can spill over into. Otherwise they would have been able to restore the stability of the vessel and prepare to abandon ship, remove the individual lifesaving equipment from undamaged compartments, release the life rafts and ready the inflatable dinghy and other equipment; they would not have frozen in the water...

It must be admitted that they did not have enough knowledge and solid, automatic skills in fighting the accident or well-defined interaction between the main command post and the compartment emergency teams or the whole crew of the boat. And, of course, a detailed familiarity with the emergency experience of other nuclear submarines. I would like to ask once more—is the crew to blame for that? No, it is a misfortune.

The true authors of the tragedy in the Norwegian Sea are those who were obligated to organize the training of sailors for entry into combat service, to organize carefully the quality of that training and be entirely convinced that the people are absolutely ready for action in any emergency situation. The senior officers of the task force that included the submarine had not done this.

The chief of staff was replaced three times in the almost four years that the training of the second crew of the experimental boat, not intended for regular patrol duty, was underway, and the commander and three of his deputy commanders left the force over two months in 1989. All of the admirals on the staff and the leading services of the task force—that is, the people who should have been monitoring the training of the sailors—were replaced over the year and a half starting in the middle of 1987.

Moreover, almost all of the newly assigned officers came from other task forces of the fleet without the appropriate retraining. They had no conception in particular

of the specific nature of the Komsomolets. How, it is asked, can a crew be trained if the officer himself is sitting at the student's desk?

The process of cutbacks in the army and navy, the movement of people from job to job, is a normal phenomenon, but a public wisdom should be displayed therein so that professionals are replaced with professionals; the personnel leap-frog that is flourishing even today in the navy is entirely destroying the tradition, which took shape over many years, of continuity among commanders on ships, in task forces and formations, depriving young specialists of the experience gained through blood and pain by their predecessors, diminishing the criteria of training for combat service, destroying operational tactical concepts and not permitting the successful resolution of either official or social and domestic problems. And all of this leads to a decline in the professional competence of specialists, a weakening of combat readiness and, ultimately, to tragedies such as the one that occurred on the Komsomolets. This tragedy demonstrates once again that questions of professionalism are central today.

But before our "Analysis," a document containing 127 pages of typewritten text, diagrams and graphs, lessons of the accident, recommendations and more has been sent around the fleet by the commander-in-chief of the navy with an accompanying note, reducing all of our work to naught. Does the naval command have no vested interest in establishing the truth?

And a final thing, which cannot be left unsaid. Let us remember not only the Komsomolets, but another two submarines as well that have been lost recently. We will remember the courageous people who perished and the living, those who are now on watch in the ocean depths, their families and loved ones, the thousands of youth who dream of the sea and ships...

The genuine, and not the illusory, prestige of our fleet demands the truth, however bitter it may be. Everything begins with the truth.

### Dutch Contract To Raise 'Komsomolets' Questioned

90SV0065B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
14 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by A. Ustyugov, D. Aksenenko, and A. Ros-torguev, employees at the Altay Scientific Industrial Association (NPO), under the rubric "There Is Another Opinion": "How Much Will This 'Commercial Secret' Cost, or Several Questions Regarding the Contract on the Salvaging of the 'Komsomolets' Nuclear Submarine"]

[Text] As early as this summer, the organs of the mass media (including KRASNAYA ZVEZDA) reported that academician I. Spasskiy, the chief designer at the Ministry of Trade's Rubin Central Design Bureau (TsKB MT), and K. Reinhart, the director of a consortium of

Dutch firms, signed a Soviet-Dutch contract on the salvaging of the "Komsomolets". Many publications hastened to persuade their readers that the signing of this contract was a necessary measure in view of the inability of our own science and industry to convert such a plan into the technical solutions and the creation of the unique equipment, which would meet the requirements of this grandiose operation.

Is it possible that our own country's scientific community has fallen into such a decline that we squander currency, which is so scarce in our country, while subsidizing the development of prospective technologies in the West?

As early as May 1989, on the basis of projects completed by employees at the Altay NPO, the academician I. Spasskiy was informed of the possibility of using variable capacity pontoons, in which the lifting force is provided by displacing water with powdered gases from a gas generator, to salvage sunken ships and submarines. At that time this direction of efforts, which concluded with the series production of the gas generators, received approval, however the technical aspect of solving the problem was not subsequently agreed upon with the Altay association. It is difficult to imagine what guided the experts, who were considering the proposed plans for salvaging the "Komsomolets", asserting that it was impossible to create a lifting force of almost six thousand tons using pontoons. Since the middle of the 1980s, projects, including on-site projects, to salvage loads from great depths using elastic bladders inflated with powdered gases have been conducted in the Soviet Union. It is another matter that the development of this idea is in the same disastrous state as the development of the rescue service.

Signing this contract aggravates the situation even more. The Rubin TsKB MT will promote the development of foreign firms using our country's resources, while our own scientific and technological achievements will simply remain in the status of poor relatives.

Judging from press reports, the main factor, which tipped the scale in favor of the Soviet-Dutch contract was temporal. Then, however, a question is appropriate: why has no work been done on the development of our own country's salvage equipment from April 1989 to the present? After all, even the Dutch will not start work tomorrow, and they will be involved with perfecting their equipment for at least a year yet. If one believes the statements of our nuclear power specialists, nothing will happen to the "Komsomolets" before 1993, when it will be feasible for our own country's equipment to salvage sunken submarines (given the appropriate financial investments, of course). Then what was this haste for? Is it possible that it was only for the sake of the publicity, on account of which the Dutch have allegedly taken upon themselves a mission of conducting a unique operation. But both the publicity and the currency, the amount of which is shrouded in the darkness of a "commercial

secret", will not do us any good, but will benefit foreigners. And future joint use of unique structures for salvaging ships will hardly cover our "hush-hush" expenditures. In spite of the growing labor differentials on the world market, not every State or private firm will permit itself to order a unique rig for salvaging sunken ships, if circumstances permit them to manage with their own resources.

A zealous master cares first and foremost for his own house. In this deal it seems that our "masters", once again while speaking in the name of the people, care more about the dividends of the Dutch consortium. In the final analysis, our State will suffer not only material losses, but also spiritual losses. Publicity is created for a

foreign firm at our expense and the country's scientific and technological potential is assigned the unenviable role of a super.

The people, on behalf of whom the Rubin TsKB MT, which has never before been involved with salvaging ships, is spending money (also on the instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers), have a right to know what additional expenses are promised by signing the contract.

**From the Editorial Staff.** Many of our readers have asked the question: What was the Rubin organization and its manager thinking about during the signing of the contract with the Dutch? It seems that academician I. Spasskiy could make things clear regarding this. The newspaper is prepared to publish his arguments and justifications.

**Ochirov: Military Aspects of Union Treaty**

91UM0070A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
31 Oct 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Issues Committee Deputy Chairman Colonel V. Ochirov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Parliamentary Commentator Captain 2nd Rank V. Urban under the rubric: "Politics: Assessments and Predictions": "The Union Treaty. What Awaits the Army?"]

[Text] It is difficult to list all of the questions and answers which society expects from politicians. One of these questions is the Union Treaty. And perhaps here the Army has the most unclear position. But the problems need to be resolved somehow or other.

Our Parliamentary Commentator Captain 2nd Rank V. Urban conducted an interview about this with USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Issues Committee Deputy Chairman Colonel V. Ochirov.

[Urban] Valeriy Nikolayevich, the first question will be the most difficult. The Parliament has already been working on the elaboration of the Union Treaty for over a month. But we have not yet seen any particular results. Do you agree?

[Ochirov] Not quite. This is a topic for a long, serious conversation. But you cannot get by without general assessments or without a sort of excursion into the essence of the issue. Shall we begin with this?

[Urban] Fine. It appears to me that the deputies were already manifesting a certain frivolousness in the assessment of the state of our federation during the discussion of R. Nishanov's report on the course of the summer consultations with working groups from the republics. In many speeches—and I carefully studied the transcript—quite private issues were raised. From this point of view, a discussion on defense issues is noteworthy. At times we have had to think that the deputies are not even delving into the logic of the development of events in the country and in the world and do not know what our people and their partners in the international arena expect from them.

[Ochirov] I would also like you to tell me about logic. Right now when I have become totally involved with these issues, I understand: There was some sort of lack of reasoning at that session. Take the unplanned discussion concerning Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's pamphlet "Kak nam obustroit Rossiyu?" [How Do We Revitalize Russia?]. It is difficult not to agree with the deputies' assessments and afterward the President of the USSR's words but it is not deputies' business to initiate debates on literary works. It is already long since time to be tolerant toward writers' opinions. It is no accident that the dynamics of the conversation were lost—how do we structure the Union. This affects the country's defense.

Right now the committees and commissions in principle are actively elaborating issues associated with the Union

Treaty. But one does not sense coordination among them. So, one can be mistaken in the main thing. For us the main thing is expressed in safeguarding the country's defense capability. So, I basically agree with how you posed the question.

[Urban] We recently learned that M. Gorbachev has already distributed a draft Union Treaty to republic leaders. A new question immediately arises here: Consequently, the Supreme Soviet somehow remains out of the loop?

[Ochirov] This is just the initial draft. And I assure you it will be significantly amended. As they say, there is no end to the work here. Let us take just the purely military "sector." Committee members and our experts are scrupulously studying the documents submitted by the republics. We are also conducting negotiations on defense aspects of the future Union with deputies of republic parliaments. This is important because ultimately precisely the union republic Supreme Soviets will ratify the Union Treaty which has been concluded.

[Urban] But much was already clear during the summer. Working groups had mainly agreed that defense would remain within the center's jurisdiction. Are new problems really possible?

[Ochirov] While everything has occurred and is occurring on the level of expert assessments. Moreover, the situation in the republics is also changing with the adoption of declarations of sovereignty. Let us take Belorussia. Belorussian Parliament deputies with whom I met recently announced: Their declaration states that the republic is justified to have its own armed forces and that in the future it will become a nuclear free zone and a neutral state. As a result, the question is raised with my interlocutors about what kind of field of activity we leave them. So, we are going to have to conduct these consultations in a specific manner and to seek compromises. Let us also add here the fact that the Baltic republics and Georgia are not participating in this process.

[Urban] Those republics are precisely where the status of our ground and naval forces is least defined right now. It is sufficient to recall the decisions adopted by the parliaments and governments of the Baltic republics. These are also a restriction of servicemen's voting rights, a ban on residence permits, and termination of the allocation of plots of land for housing construction. We can continue listing examples but perhaps these words express the very essence of the matter: "The Army must know its place....", stated by Latvian Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Gorbunov during a Moscow Radio interview. And meanwhile we get just statements of the general plan from the center and appeals which local authorities no longer even heed. And next? We would like to know the committee's opinion?

[Ochirov] In the Baltic republics, yes and in several others, conditions are being prepared for creation of their own armed forces. This is a reality to which it is impossible to close our eyes. As for the Army's legal

status, this is my deep conviction: Right now, everything in our country must be resolved through intergovernmental agreements. The sooner, the better. Otherwise, the problem will be driven deeper.

[Urban] Incidentally, several proposals on the future structure of the Armed Forces and internal troops were submitted for discussion of the union parliament. One of them has become quite widely disseminated right now: This is all-union strategic professional formations and republic (territorial) troops or their own internal troops. The prognoses for realizing this idea are quite varied.... But has the committee conducted an analysis of this problem?

[Ochirov] Of course. This is one of the committee's primary tasks. Here are the arguments that we must recognize. Right now the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] is striving to create a municipal militia that the Soviets would be responsible for and the militias in turn would be subordinate to the Soviets. But why not act in the same way with internal troops? All the more so since many republics have already adopted their own laws on permanent armed formations to maintain public order. The republics will defend these positions. But the functions of the local, let us put it this way, subunits must be strictly regulated so that they do not become the cause for any kind of destabilizing processes.

[Urban] Naturally opponents of this idea submit the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan as an example. Let us imagine the participation of ethnic troops in them. This is another "stimulus" for tension.

[Ochirov] I am talking about principles and prospects. But, having cast off all prejudices, republic leaders must extinguish conflicts like the Armenia-Azerbaijan one through negotiations.

[Urban] There also is no unity in forecasts on the future strategic forces. Let us take just one of the Union Treaty drafts that won third prize in the Interregional Deputies Group competition. There it is written that in the event a republic secedes from the confederation, it receives its share of nuclear and chemical weapons in proportion to the size of its population. It will also be difficult to overcome these delusions.

[Ochirov] I agree. Here we observe precisely that frivolousness which we have already discussed. Any sober-minded politician in the world understands that, with the present quantity of nuclear weapons, we need to deal with a partner who has total control over his own arsenal and single command and control over these weapons.

[Urban] I think that this criticism also applies to the parliament itself. It is sufficient to cite excerpts from the speech of Armenian Deputy L. Arutyunyan: "You are laughing in vain when you pose the question about distribution of weapons...." The country's national wealth must be divided because it has been created by the peoples and there is the highest justice in this. I am not saying that the world will agree with the fact that our weapons will be divided into 15 and maybe even into 53 parts, that the

individual republics will have nuclear weapons—I would not want and do not suggest this. I ask you to understand that this issue will be raised.... "Does this mean that we will divide them?

[Ochirov] People nevertheless think that the highest justice is peace and not parcelling out arms. At least many colleagues do not share the statements of the respected Lyudmila Akopovna. To divide arms means to weaken first of all our statehood. This will also play a negative role in the international arena. I have quite frequently had to meet with Western parliamentarians and experts on disarmament issues. Their opinion on this issue is simple. I sense that they are seriously troubled by the "divisive" trends in our country.

[Urban] Maybe this will at least convince some of our radicals since they are not interested in the opinion of their own people. So I will cite the lines about the situation in the USSR from the influential NEW YORK TIMES newspaper: "How to maintain control over nuclear weapons when power moves from the center to the republics, regions, and even to the cities? And if a fierce civil conflict suddenly breaks out, will the desire not arise in someone to get around this control?"

[Ochirov] This is just one aspect of the problem. No less important for us is, so to speak, the intra-union part. Therefore, the committee will defend strict center control over nuclear weapons.

[Urban] But does it not seem to you that the center will resort to serious compromises on other issues at the expense of the Army?

[Ochirov] This will pass against the committee's will but such is reality. Under current conditions, agreements between the republics will not be concluded without this. But the committee will add that the Union Treaty will clearly state the republics' legal obligations to the Armed Forces with regard to social and political guarantees of servicemen and members of their families. Furthermore, this should not be limited by declarations and it is necessary to have precise standards on financing the Army in particular. It is worthwhile to provide for the supremacy of union legislation on defense issues. And the republics must reinforce this.

[Urban] Consequently, adoption of laws on defense and on the status of servicemen is being delayed for now?

[Ochirov] Unfortunately, this is so. But many factors of future military reform which are being stormily discussed right now will disappear by themselves after conclusion of the Union Treaty.

[Urban] Valeriy Nikolayevich, your prediction about the conclusion of the treaty is quite interesting. Hypothetical time periods have been indicated for now. They are the end of this year and the beginning of the new year. Do you think it will be that way?

[Ochirov] Hardly. You see how many ambiguities and how few compromises there are. Furthermore, the risk exists that in the near future we will not succeed in organizing a completely new all-union economic market. And we plan to create the new Union precisely with the aid of and on the foundation of the market.

**Uzbek Presidential Decree on Draft, Military Service**

91UM0055C *Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian  
5 Sep 90 p 1

[Decree of the President of the Uzbek SSR on Measures for Improving Call-Up and Service Conditions of Republic Youth, 4 Sep 90]

[Text] To assure the rights and liberties of Uzbek SSR citizens called up for military duty, to protect the interests of their families, and to effect improvements in call-up and service conditions of republic youth, it is hereby decreed to:

1. Order a cessation, commencing with the fall of 1990, of call-up of republic youth for service in military construction units stationed outside the boundaries of the Uzbek SSR.

2. Pursue, from this date onward, a policy of calling up youth for service in the Armed Forces of the USSR in accordance with agreements concluded between the Republic Government and the respective union organs.

Instruct the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR to conclude agreements, prior to the spring 1991 call-up, with the respective union organs, with the intent of specifying the number of conscripts, conditions under which they will serve, assurances of their safety and of social protection for conscripts and their dependents. The conscripts will be provided a protective escort to their duty station and to their place of permanent residence.

3. Prohibit the call-up for active duty of draft-age youths whose brother has lost his life while fulfilling his military obligation in peacetime.

4. Establish a republic fund to offer additional compensation to conscripts who have suffered permanent disabilities, and to the families of men who have lost their lives while on active duty.

The Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR is to devise the ways and means of disbursing said additional compensation.

5. Assure compliance with paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Decree, and to increase responsibility of the respective organs relative to the strict observance of constitutional norms relating to military duty of conscripts, by:

—elevating the Military Commissariat of the Uzbek SSR to the status of Republic organ;  
—appropriating republic funds to create the Tashkent Oblast Military Commissariat.

The provision regarding the Republic Military Commissariat is to be submitted for examination to the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR.

6. Task the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR with establishing the new position of deputy health minister of the Uzbek SSR and assign one regular position each to

the Ministry of Health of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, health administrations (departments) of obispolkoms, and to the Tashkent gorispolkom, to organize work oriented toward improving the health of draft-age youths and the exercise of strict medical supervision at induction stations.

7. Charge the Council of Ministers of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, the obispolkoms, the Tashkent gorispolkom, trade union and Komsomol organizations with intensifying patronage work in military units constituting a duty station for youths called up from the Uzbek SSR;—with organizing regular visits to military subunits by representatives of the public, war and labor veterans, persons prominent in culture and the arts, and amateur activities; and with providing books, magazines, newspapers, motion and picture films portraying life in the republic;  
—with carrying out work directly related to the selection and assignment of indigenous youths to military schools for training as future commissioned officers.

8. Direct the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers to render necessary assistance to the Republic Military Commissariat in supplying subordinate military commissariats with adequate numbers of cadre fluent in Uzbek and in other languages spoken by the majority of the population residing in a given locality.

9. Require that the Uzbek SSR people's deputies, committees and commissions of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet assume active participation in the examination of the draft form of the proposed military reform by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, bearing in mind the interests of the Republic and defensive posture of the country.

10. Expect that the mass information media will give wide publicity to cases of violation of military discipline in units and to the resulting corrective measures.

(Comments on the decree will be published.)

**Response to Question on Change in Term of Service**

90SV0033C *Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian  
6 Sep 90 First Edition p 4

[Letter to the editors and response: "Term of Service: Two or Three Years?"]

[Text] I would like to ask a question. Here in Kharkov there are rumors to the effect that the Ground Forces are making a change from the two year to an 18-month term of service, while the Navy is thinking of a reduction to two years from the present two. Is that true, and, if so, when will the changes take effect?

Private I. Gorelov

Major General V. Nikitin, chief, Affairs Department, General Staff, USSR Ministry of Defense:

The USSR Ministry of Defense has completed its study of changing the term of service of Navy servicemen from three years to two years, and has turned over all pertinent documents to the USSR Council of Ministers, where they will be examined for subsequent submission to the USSR Supreme Soviet. This action is necessitated by the trend to humanize military service and shorten the length of time youths are separated from their families. It may be said that this action represents a kind of conversion in the interests of the national economy.

With respect to the Ground Forces, at the present time there are no plans to change from the two year to an 18-month term of service, since conditions are not yet ripe for that.

#### Report on Uzbek Decree on Military Service

90SV0033B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
7 Sep 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Captain A. Veklich under the rubric: "Direct Line from Tashkent": "Uzbekistan President's Decree"]

[Text] The republic press has reported on Uzbek SSR President I. A. Karimov's decree entitled "Measures for Improving the Call-Up and Service Conditions of Republic Youth."

The decree provides that call-up of youths for service in the USSR Armed Forces will henceforth be governed by agreements reached between the republic government and union organs relative to the number of young men to be drafted into the Armed Forces and the conditions under which they are to serve their tour of duty. In the decree it is stressed that the goal is the attainment of security and social protection for enlisted men and noncommissioned officers.

Noteworthy are the decree's provisions prohibiting the drafting of a youth whose brother or brothers have died in line of duty in peacetime. The presidential decree instructs the republic to pay special compensation out of its funds to conscripted personnel who have recently suffered a disability, and also to the families of men who have lost their lives in line of duty. The government of Uzbekistan is charged with the responsibility of devising and implementing a plan for making this special compensation available to those eligible.

This legislation also provides that, starting with the fall call-up, conscripted republic youths are no longer to be assigned to military construction units stationed outside the borders of the Uzbek SSR.

Emphasized in the decree is the need for strengthening of patronship ties to military collectives in which draftees from Uzbekistan are serving. Guidance is furnished to improve the selection of indigenous personnel for acceptance by military schools.

Health organs are directed to organize work that will be effective in improving the health of draft-age youths and

exercise due care—in the work of draft boards—in medical examination of young men.

The President has directed that USSR people's deputies from Uzbekistan and committees and commissions of the republic's Supreme Soviet assume active participation in the draft legislation for military reform currently under consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet, with the intent of furthering the republic's interests and the country's defensive capability.

#### Moldovan Appeal to Republic Servicemen

91UM0048B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 11 Sep 90 p 1

[Appeal from the Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR: "Appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR to Compulsory Duty Servicemen and to Citizens of the Moldovan SSR"]

[Text] Our dear countrymen—soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers!

On June 23, 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR passed an historical document: The Declaration of the Sovereignty of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova.

In developing the articles of this Declaration, on September 4, 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR passed the Resolution on Military Service for Citizens of the Moldovan SSR.

These most important documents reflect the concern of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet for the future prospects of citizens of this republic serving in the Armed Forces of the USSR and participating in regulating conflicts between nationalities, eradicating the aftermath of mass disorders in different regions of the country, and often damaging their health and exposing their lives to danger. It was all this that necessitated the passage of the Resolution on Compulsory Military Service by Citizens of the Moldovan SSR, as a rule, on the territory, of Moldova.

The government of the Moldovan SSR is conducting negotiations with the government of the USSR on issues dealing with the return of citizens of the Moldovan SSR who are now serving in the Armed Forces of the USSR outside the borders of the republic, and to have them serve the remainder of their time in military units and subunits located on the territory of the Moldovan SSR.

The Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR will, in the near future, pass the Law on Military Service by Citizens of the Moldovan SSR, which will clearly delineate the rights and obligations of the citizens of the Moldovan SSR with regard to the defense of the republic, how military service will be recorded, who will be afforded the opportunity of alternative service, and how the republic's military units will be organized. The passage

of this law will ease the worry of mothers, who always anxiously await the return of their children from the army.

Prior to the passing of this law, we appeal to all those serving in the Armed Forces of the USSR to fulfill their military obligation fairly and conscientiously, to maintain their composure and self-control, and to be worthy citizens of our dear Moldova.

### Moldovan Statute on Military Service

91UM0055A Kishinev MOLODEZH MOLDAVII  
in Russian 11 Sep 90 p 3

[Decree of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on Military Service of Citizens of the Moldovan SSR, 4 Sep 90]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR takes note of the fact that one of the factors contributing to destabilization of the socio-political situation in the republic is the negative opinion held by the populace relative to service in the USSR Armed Forces on the part of citizens of the Moldovan SSR. The employment of the republic's citizens (servicemen) to bring interethnic conflicts under control and normalize mass disorders occurring in various areas of the USSR has resulted in the deaths of a number of its citizens. In the past two years and eight months alone, 127 citizens of the Moldovan SSR have lost their lives. Many servicemen have returned to civilian life with permanent disabilities. With the deterioration in interethnic relations among servicemen, citizens of the republic, especially those of Moldovan origin, unable to withstand repeated acts of humiliation, physical abuse, and insults to their honor and dignity, choose to abandon their military units to return home. They are placed into the position of persons who appear to be in violation of existing laws pertaining to military service, by committing the act of desertion, with consequent threat of being the object of criminal liability action.

The abovementioned situation gives rise to grief and dismay on the part of mothers, friends, and relatives, and is a cause of open anti-Army sentiments. It leads people to believe that military unit and subunit commanders, including the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces, are incapable of providing proper conditions for carrying out military duties and of assuring personal safety and protection of life and health of servicemen.

Cognizant of its responsibility of protecting the rights, honor, and dignity of the republic's citizens and of safeguarding life, health, and the need for settling problems associated with the possibility of the republic's citizens performing their military duty within the borders of the Moldovan SSR and the creation of legal, organizational, and material-technical conditions to effect this, and, being guided by paragraphs 5 and 8 of the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Moldovan SSR, and also by Article 74, paragraphs 15, 23, and 97 of the

Constitution of the Moldovan SSR, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova does hereby decree to:

1. Suspend, within the borders of the Moldovan SSR, Articles 31, 62, and 63 of the Constitution of the USSR; the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation of 12 October 1967; the 28 March 1990 USSR Law on Introducing Amendments into the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation; the USSR Law on Criminal Liability for Military Crimes of 25 December 1958; Articles 60 and 61 of the Constitution of the Moldovan SSR; and Articles 77, 78, 248, 249, and 250 of the Moldovan SSR Criminal Code; to become effective immediately upon adoption of this Decree.
2. Ordain that citizens of the Moldovan SSR are not to be called up for active military duty in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces, and persons subject to military service are not to be called up for training, pending special action on the part of the Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR.
3. Task the Government of the Moldovan SSR with the following:
  - 1) Immediate initiation of negotiations with the Government of the USSR relative to the following:— Reassignment of citizens of the Moldovan SSR on active duty in the Armed Forces of the USSR, and those serving in all branches of the service that are maintaining public order and controlling interethnic conflicts in various areas of the USSR, so that these personnel can complete their term of service in military units and subunits stationed within the borders of the Moldovan SSR, with this action to be completed by 15 October 1990.
  - Assignment of citizens of the Moldovan SSR to military service within the borders of the republic, commencing with the spring of 1991, and the organization of a National Army of the Moldovan SSR.
  - Assignment of citizens of the Moldovan SSR to military service, on a volunteer basis, to certain branches of the USSR Armed Forces for duty beyond the borders of the Moldovan SSR.
  - 2) Develop a program for organizing units of a National Army of the Moldovan SSR and creation of material-technical conditions for the permanent functioning of said Army.
  - 3) Organize a State Department of Military Problems.
4. Develop, by means of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet Commissions for State Security and Military Problems, Problems of the Struggle Against Crime and Questions of Law, working jointly with the Government of the Moldovan SSR, a draft form of the Moldovan SSR Law on Military Service of Citizens of the Moldovan SSR, to include the introduction of alternative service based on various grounds for certain categories of the republic's citizens, and submitting the latter to the Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR for consideration in the forthcoming regular session.

5. Charge the Commission for State Security and Military Problems of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet with the implementation of this Decree.

6. This Decree is enacted into law on the day of adoption.

**Moldova: Presidential Decree on Draft**

*91UM0055B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 13 Sep 90 p 1*

[Decree of the President of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova on Call-Up of Moldovan SSR Citizens for Military Service, 10 Sep 90]

[Text] In compliance with the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet Decree on Military Service of Citizens of the Moldovan SSR of 4 September 1990, and being guided by Article 113<sup>7</sup> of the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Moldovan SSR, I do hereby decree to:

1. Postpone the call-up of citizens of the Moldovan SSR for active duty in the Armed Forces of the USSR, pending completion of negotiations between the Government of the Moldovan SSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, as provided for by paragraph three of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet Decree of 4 September 1990.

2. Ordain that the Military Commissariat of the Moldovan SSR and the military commissariats of rayons are authorized to call up for active duty in the Armed Forces of the USSR only those citizens of the Moldovan SSR that make written application to this end, with accompanying agreement signed by the parents of the persons making such application.

3. Charge the Government of the Moldovan SSR with maintaining constant and close supervision over the strict and uniform compliance with this Decree throughout the Moldovan SSR.

4. Instruct the Government of the Moldovan SSR to enter into immediate negotiations with the USSR Council of Ministers, in compliance with the wishes of the Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR. The results of the negotiations are to be communicated to the Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR and to the undersigned.

5. This Decree is enacted into law immediately upon adoption.

M. Snegur

President, Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova

**Appeal To Implement Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Decree On Army Service**

*91UN0016B Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian  
19 Sep 90 p 1*

[Appeal by A. Matviyenko, the head of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission of Youth Affairs: "Return the Small Hawks!"]

[Text]

**A Copy: The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Head of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, Maslov, V. A.**

In connection with the fact that numerous citizens have returned, [from military service] the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission of Youth Affairs has examined the course of the execution of the resolution of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet "Regarding the observance of the term of military service of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR and the use of workers in the civil defense organs of the republic beyond its borders."

Information was heard that was given by the members of the commission, the official representatives of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and the Kiev military district. It has been established that specific measures are being taken in order to increase the likelihood that military terms of service for citizens of the Ukrainian SSR will be served on its territory. A number of military service people and workers of the civil defense organs have been called back from the regions of internationality conflicts.

In addition to this, the commission thinks that the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and other state institutions of the republic and the USSR are not making a sufficient enough effort to insure that the resolutions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet are being executed to their full extent. The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers has not established a necessary mechanism to insure its [resolutions] are realized, it has not consulted with the Union administration with the aim of introducing changes to the current jurisprudence, in accordance with which the passage of military service is determined by the legislation of the USSR.

The USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Ministry of Defense have in fact not reacted to the resolution of the higher legislative organ of the republic.

In turn, the commission, which has accepted the aforementioned resolution, thinks that the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet has also not taken into account to a complete extent the real possibilities for its execution in the set period of time for doing so.

All this lessens the authority of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, encourages the growth of civic tension during the call-up period which is now beginning. It is known that the situation has already led to conflicts among the military organs, which have been forced to follow normative acts, which have not lost their judicial authority; and that the local authority in certain regions and some civic associations of the republic, are demanding that action be taken in accordance to the resolution of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Taking into account the aforementioned matters, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission of Youth Affairs has resolved the following:

1. To present the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium with a proposition to periodically analyze the course of the execution of the resolution of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet "Regarding the observance of the term of military service of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR and the use of workers in the civil defense organs of the republic beyond its borders," to evaluate the work of the state institutions of the republic and the USSR, and to pass the appropriate resolutions. In case the need arises, to include this issue among those at the top of the agenda of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet 2nd Congress, to specify more exactly the deadline set for executing the resolution, which is provided for in the bill.
2. To propose a mechanism which is to execute resolutions that have been passed;
  - to introduce necessary changes to the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR;
  - to create in the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet a commission of deputies which is to be responsible for the issue of defense and state security; [to create] in the structure of the Council of Ministers of the republic—a committee that is to be responsible for relations with the USSR Ministry of Defense; to renew the military-mobile divisions in the judicial committees of the local councils;
  - to create a centralized-republic military committee;
  - to examine the status and the real role of the call-up commissions; to propose to the local organs of authority to take under their special control and to re-orient them [the call-up commissions] so that they defend the citizens' interests;
  - to immediately begin consulting the union government with the aim of examining the conditions of the call-up to the ranks of the armed forces of the USSR. Specifically, to determine the minimal necessary percent of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR to be included [in these armed forces of the USSR] that are to serve their military term of duty beyond the borders of the republic on a voluntary basis, at the same time to consider granting [such recruits] relief in the form of shortening their length of service, offering them the right to choose which branch of the armed forces they want to serve in, and to establish contractual type of relations, and so on;
  - to create an alternative service in various branches of the republic's economy;
3. To publish the resolutions of the commission in the press.

#### **Lt-Gen Markovskiy Interviewed on Fall Draft**

91UM0017A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
3 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant General F. Markovskiy, first deputy chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff main directorate, on the beginning day of the fall draft,

by Colonel R. Makushin; place not specified, under rubric "Fall Draft has Begun": "A Task of State Importance"]

[Text] *On the day the fall draft began our correspondent met with Lieutenant General F. Markovskiy, first deputy chief of a main directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, and requested him to answer a number of questions connected with this event.*

[Makushin] Comrade Lieutenant General, I fully understand that it is premature to talk today about how the fall draft will shape up and what it will produce. Nevertheless, what forecasts are you constructing based on the present situation in the country and results of preparatory work for the draft?

[Markovskiy] It is difficult to construct long-term forecasts in such an important matter, but as of today they are not comforting. Difficulties with the draft are inevitable. Without going into details (I believe they are familiar to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers), I will remind you that back on the eve of the spring draft a large number of acts were adopted in some republics which can be called nothing other than illegal and which to a certain extent disrupted the previous draft. Here are a few figures. The draft was 55.5 percent of the plan in the Latvian SSR, 42.1 percent in the Estonian SSR, 28 percent in the Georgian SSR and 7.5 percent in the Armenian SSR.

[Makushin] And in your view this situation shows no tendency to improve?

[Markovskiy] Judging from everything, no. Moreover, it is aggravated by the circumstance that negative processes connected with the draft are continuing to develop now.

The "Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Ukraine" adopted on 16 July 1990 states unequivocally that the Ukraine has the right to its own armed forces and that its citizens as a rule must perform service on the territory of their republic and cannot be used for military purposes outside its limits without the consent of the UKSSR Supreme Soviet. The decree of the ARSSR Supreme Soviet of 16 August 1990 and the decree of the Supreme Soviet of Moldova [Moldavian] SSR of 4 September 1990 make an even more specific statement on this score.

If in addition we take into account numerous protests by citizens, especially of the RSFSR, Ukraine and Belarusia, concerning participation of first-term servicemen in measures to stabilize the situation in republics of the Transcaucasus, the fact that the next draft of citizens for active military service will take place under even more unfavorable conditions becomes indisputable, and this is fraught with most serious consequences for Armed Forces combat readiness and for defensive capability of the state as a whole.

[Makushin] Lately, and especially during the draft, many of our readers have sent questions and suggestions to the

editors on organizing alternative service, on making a transition to a territorial principle of manpower acquisition, about the volunteer principle and so on. Is anything being done now in this sense with consideration of all these suggestions?

[Markovskiy] The viewpoint of the Ministry of Defense on these questions is generally known, and it is by no means a matter of the ministry's inertness here. It is above all a matter of the country's economic and financial potentials. Moreover, if we view defense as a joint task of all union republics, then in this case how can a question be posed, let us say, about the territorial principle of Armed Forces manpower acquisition if Russia, for example, cannot provide the human resources for Army and Navy forces stationed on its territory, while to the contrary, the volume of draft resources for all other union republics considerably exceeds the requirements for troops stationed within their bounds?

[Makushin] Nevertheless, in your opinion what can have a positive effect on the course of the fall draft and who can take what measures for it to proceed successfully?

[Markovskiy] I think it would be extremely necessary for the USSR Supreme Soviet to make a decision in this very session or at least express its attitude publicly toward the questions mentioned here. With the authority given it by all the Soviet people, the Supreme Soviet should have rescinded the legislative acts of union republics on military questions adopted in violation of the USSR Constitution and the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation." A special decree is needed to stop instances of servicemen's desertion as well as to rigidify measures blocking evasion of performance of active military duty. It would be very well if even today, before finishing work on the draft union treaty, the Supreme Soviet expressed its attitude toward the question of Armed Forces organizational development based on the territorial-republic principle. This probably is the most burning question. The absence of a precise position on it on the part of the legislative body is having a negative effect on assurance of the call-up of citizens for service.

#### Tajik Decree Restricting Military Draft

91UM0079A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST  
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 9 Oct 90 p 1

[“Decree of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet: On Certain Questions of Improving the Draft of Young People of the Tajik SSR into the USSR Armed Forces”]

[Text] Thousands of young men of the Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] perform their military service in the USSR Armed Forces annually. They are represented in all branches and arms of the service. At the same time, however, owing to a number of circumstances of an objective nature, a substantial proportion of conscripts performs its constitutional duty in the military construction and construction and engineering units of the USSR Ministry of Defense and of union-level ministries and departments.

The difficult socio-economic situation in which our society finds itself and the exacerbation of interethnic relations in the country have led to a complication of the crime-inducing situation, including in the Soviet Army. Negative phenomena in the Army milieu and the current nonregulation relations between servicemen are directly influencing the level of their operational training and causing concern among the community of the republic and near ones and dear ones.

For the purpose of the further assurance of the guarantees of compliance with the rights and liberties of citizens of the Tajik SSR drafted for active military service and the defense of the interests of their parents and families and also an improvement in the draft and the performance of their military service by the youth of the republic, the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. That young men of the Tajik SSR will be drafted into military construction and construction and engineering units as of the 1990 fall draft within the Turkestan Military District, chiefly in the Tajik SSR.

That the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers will prior to 1 December 1990 prepare proposals pertaining to the organization in the Tajik SSR of alternative service and the procedure of its performance by young men who in accordance with their state of health are not suitable for service in line military units.

2. To cease the draft for active military service of conscripts whose brothers have died in the performance of their duties in peace time in the ranks of the Soviet Army and also in performance of their international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan.

That the rayon and city draft commissions:

—grant deferments for young men being trained in secondary specialized educational institutions and vocational-technical schools of a construction-engineering profile for the period of the study and for one year following graduation from the educational institution provided that they work in the specialty they have acquired;

—send conscripts with families to perform their military service in units and subunits stationed on the territory of the Turkestan Military District, chiefly in the Tajik SSR;

—grant younger brothers deferments until older brothers have completed their service.

3. To establish supplementary benefits for compulsory service personnel who have become invalids as a consequence of disabling injury and also for families of servicemen who have died in the performance of their duties.

That the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers draw up prior to 1 December 1990 the procedure and conditions of the allocation of the supplementary benefits.

4. That the oblast, city, and rayon soviets of people's deputies and enterprises, establishments, and organizations step up sponsorship of military units in which young men drafted from the Tajik SSR are serving and provide for the allocation of monies for the organization of trips to the Army subunits by representatives of the community, veterans of war and labor, and figures of culture and art and the amateur arts, and the dispatch of books, periodicals, and motion pictures illustrating the life of the republic.

5. That the military commissar of the Tajik SSR adopt measures to strengthen the local military commissariats with personnel who know Tajik and the other languages of the majority population living in a given locality.

6. That the Tajik SSR Military Commissariat and Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation and Citizens' Rights and Appeals draw up draft regulations governing the military commissariat of the Tajik SSR and submit them for consideration by the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

7. That the Tajik SSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting pay particular attention to the elaboration of military-patriotic problems in radio and television programs and extensive coverage of the status and problems of the performance of their military service by young men of the Tajik SSR.

K. Makhkamov, chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

5 October 1990, Dushanbe.

#### Azerbaijani Agreement on Place of Service of Republic Draftees

91UM0048A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin: "Direct Line": "Suspension of Draft Call Threatened." Yesterday's report of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents from Nakhichevani]

[Text] At a session of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR on October 2nd, a resolution was passed after it had been agreed to by the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR KGB, the USSR MVD, and the Directorate of Railway Engineering Troops, which states that 50% of the draftees—in accordance with the general quota planned for the autumn of 1990—will remain on the territory of the republic to fulfill their military obligation.

Pursuant to this resolution, the plan is to leave in Azerbaijan all military construction specialists, military members of the MVD, railway engineering troops, and civil defense troops, as well as military forces of the PVO, Air Force, Navy, and the KGB. It was decided that 25% of the draftees designated for duty with the Ground Forces will remain in the republic. Beginning with this draft call, it was decided to exempt from military service

all young men whose brothers died during peace time service with the army or navy beginning with 1985.

I met with Lt Colonel Kh. Balayev, Deputy of the Military Commissariat of the Nakhichevan ASSR, and asked him to comment on this resolution, using as an example the draft call campaign in the autonomous republic.

"Unfortunately," said Khosrov Alidzabarovich, "even this decision, which is without a doubt a correct one, has not had any real influence on the mindset of the draftees and their parents. The existing tension in areas bordering on Armenia remains high and explosive. For all practical purposes, due to its geographical location, the entire autonomous republic is one such area. Under these conditions, young men do not want to leave their villages and relatives to the whims of fate. And the people have less and less confidence in the government's ability to halt an attack by the Armenians."

"There is also another factor. Cases of Nakhichevan youths coming back home on their own volition from military units have become more frequent. At the present time we have around fifty such runaways in our republic. All were motivated to return, they say, because they were mocked by their fellow servicemen and because of problems based on nationality. These events are also leaving their imprint on the draftcall."

The military commissariat workers showed me four fat folders in which, just for this year alone, they had collected several hundred copies of telegrams that had been sent by the military commissariat to commanders of military units requesting them to give, if nothing more, just a brief account of how the servicemen from Nakhichevan are doing. Only some fifteen commanders responded to these telegrams.

Military commissariat workers are forecasting that more than one half of the draftees may not show up at the induction center. And this is notwithstanding the fact that the military commissariat workers are conducting an educational campaign in literally every draftee's home. Here is a characteristic detail: In all 22 cases of draft evasion that occurred during the spring call-up, the republic's prosecution office refused to deal with them as criminal cases.

#### Fall Draft in Klaypeda

91UM0052A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Gromak under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Laws Protecting Deserters"]

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel V. Sinterev, acting Klaypeda city military commissar, drawing on the authority of the USSR Council of Minister's decree, issued an order calling up citizens for active military duty. Paragraph 5 of the order is clear and unambiguous: "Citizens who do not report at the designated time for the call to active

military duty or those who fail to report to the induction station will be held responsible for their actions in accordance with existing laws."

However, several days later a Klaypeda newspaper published an announcement placed by Ts. Norkus, the "chief of the Klaypeda zone of the Territorial Guard Department." The announcement carried the title "Youths Are Protected by Laws." The text consisted of advice on "what youths and their parents are to do" to avoid military service and "obtain protection under the laws of the Lithuanian Republic."

In addition, a rumor is being spread in Klaypeda to the effect that a draftee is grabbed as soon as he appears at the military commissariat and whisked off to serve in some remote place.

I decided to ascertain the facts. Statistical data point out the groundlessness of the rumors. The spring of 1990 callup in Lithuania drew 40.7 percent of the young men that were eligible for duty. In Klaypeda the figure was higher, amounting to 70.4 percent. About 80 percent of the inductees were assigned to units stationed within the confines of the Baltic Military District. This distribution will be repeated.

I must say for the sake of completeness that a small percentage of Klaypeda soldiers, permitting itself to believe the promises made by the republic's Supreme Soviet, deserted the Army.

"In analyzing the list of deserters," said Major A. Sulima, "I can safely conclude that the majority of them are youths that are troublesome—youths that are known to the militia."

Deserter I. Vabolos, who was less than exemplary in his behavior in civilian life, managed to distinguish himself in the Army as well: Criminal charges were brought against him for desertion and major theft. After fleeing his unit, he saw fit to commit the second violation, for which he was detained by the Vilnius militia. However, he was released in three days.

Deserter A. Laurinaytes is wanted by the Klaypeda militia for committing rape in that city. He committed the crime after leaving his unit.

These examples are sufficient to arrive at a realization of whom the Lithuanian laws are protecting.

#### **Leningrad: Rising Numbers Unfit for Service**

91UM0052B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 20 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 1st Rank A. Zlydnev in the column "Fall Call-Up": "Problems Mounting"]

[Text] It is quite clear that the situation at induction stations is not the same as it was only a few short years ago.

After spending some time at one of Leningrad's induction stations, where I spoke with military commissariat

workers and draftees, I left with what I can only describe as a depressing feeling.

I learned the following. It used to be that, in past years, young men, even those afflicted with rather serious illnesses, would attempt to hide this from the medical examining board ("Heaven forbid their finding out—they will reject me!"). Now, however, it often happens that young men when asked to report do the opposite, claiming that they suffer from diseases that do not exist in fact.

Incidentally, examining boards are fully qualified to single out the pretenders. Another aspect of the problem—something that is most worrisome—is the fact that many youths really are seriously ill.

I had a conversation with Major General Anatoliy Yakovlevich Obukhov, the military commissar of Leningrad, who said the following:

"There is an alarming increase in youths who cannot be drafted for reasons of health. Last year one out of 10 Leningraders could not join the ranks of soldiers due to poor health, but now as many as 15 percent of draft-age men are found to be unfit for peacetime service. Many are generally incapable of performing military service. I wish to stress that this problem is not merely departmental; it is one of state level, concerning the physical health of the young generation.

"The incidence of crimes committed by young men is also on the rise. It is sufficient to say that, of the total number of youths subject to registration but not inducted last year, almost a third had a criminal record. Many draft-age youths are addicted to alcohol, narcotics, and other substances. Also extremely worrisome is the fact that the general educational level of draft-age youths has exhibited a sharp drop. This is attributable not only to deferment of full-time VUZ students, but also to lack of interest in completion of secondary education on the part of the youths. The number of draft-age men possessing less than nine years of education has doubled in Leningrad since last year, even though in the Army and Navy they would be working with equipment that requires substantial general schooling.

"Also increasing is the number of 'refuseniks.' Criminal charges were brought against 214 draft-age men as a result of the spring call-up alone.

"Occurring more frequently are cases where young men are aided and abetted in avoiding the draft by their parents. This is especially true in call-ups for service in the internal troops, military construction detachments, and in units stationed in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Baltics. For example, the following is an excerpt from a letter written by the mother of a draft-age youth: 'All registration notices come to me; my son does not see them, nor will he ever see them. I wish that he would be left alone. I will not let him go.' That is how it is. Let someone else serve: 'I will not let him go.' We are all in favor of creating a law-abiding state in word, but in deed some parents act as if the law were a hindrance. They do not realize what they are forcing their 'children' to do."

Yes, it is difficult to disagree with Anatoliy Yakovlevich. The law must be observed. Otherwise, the consequences could be unpredictable. This, incidentally, is brought out by the entire history of our state.

**Minsk PVO School Work on Transport Robotics**  
*90SV0067A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
15 Sep 90 First Edition p 4*

[Interview with Colonel A. Kun, head of the Minsk Higher Engineering Air Defense Academy, lecturer]

[Text] The USSR State Committee on Science and Technology recently made a lucrative proposal to the department of the Minsk Higher Engineering Air Defense Academy chaired by A. Kun: to create a problem-solving laboratory for doing scientific research and prototype development in manufacturing transport robots.

[Kun] The USSR State Committee proposal came as no surprise. The department has already been working on conversion for ten years. Now we are thinking about creating machines that can independently perform labor intensive tasks on collective and state farm fields such as ploughing and planting trees. This can even be done in areas where the radiation level is dangerous for humans. We have acquired experience in building robots with artificial intelligence. The department's corporate account has obtained 17 inventors certificates for inventions.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, how did this work start?

[Kun] The Cadet's Technical Construction Bureau (CTCB), headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Vasilyev, once built an intriguing toy all-terrain vehicle named "Sever" for display at an all-republic exhibition. Cadets Valeriy Vasilyev and Yurii Grachev (now already officers) and

other members of the CTCB mounted a television-guided navigation system in the all-terrain vehicle. Visitors to the exhibition showed great interest in the "Sever". Representatives of the "Integral" production combine from Minsk also liked the toy. It seems that their factory people had been working on developing a machine that could work autonomously for a long time. When they saw the potential of the "Sever" manufactured by the Minsk Higher Engineering Air Defense Academy they commissioned construction of an industrial robot for them. This robot was subsequently built. It was used for transporting micro-elements at "Integral", but turned out to be too heavy for working in the plant. So the department is working with scientists from the machine building complex of the enterprise on new overhead robotics technology.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, is your department only assisting "Integral" in building a transport robot?

[Kun] Of course not. We have a very wide collaboration with the factory. For instance when our technicians visited the plant they pointed out a flaw in the work of the microcircuit manufacturing operator in the production line. In this instance the military scientists worked on improving the plant's robots for carrying out the most delicate operations in microcircuit production.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Is the work with "Integral" unilateral, or do they help you with anything?

[Kun] Naturally there is interaction. The "Integral" production cooperative has helped us equip scientific laboratories and modernize the research base of the academy. Everyone has benefitted from the arrangement.

**Conversion: Leningrad Radiotechnical Institute**  
*90SV0065A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA*  
*in Russian 24 Aug 90 p 1*

[Interview of Yu. G. Guzhvoy, doctor of engineering sciences and director of the Leningrad Radiotechnical Scientific Research Institute, (LNIRTI) conducted by A. Davidyants, under the rubric "Within the Limits of Conversion": "Was There a Secret?"]

[Text] Until recently in Leningrad, as well as in many other cities in the country, there were many enterprises, about whose activities the townspeople could not even guess. Today, when the process of disarmament has begun in the world and a new way of thinking has prevailed in international politics, many of the establishments, which are associated in one way or another with the country's defense and were considered secret in the past, have become open establishments.

Recently in the city on the Neva, a sign also appeared on the building in which the Leningrad Radiotechnical Scientific Research Institute is located. And since this article is the first in our press, at our meeting with the director of LNIRTI, doctor of engineering sciences Yu. G. Guzhvoy, we, naturally, asked him to slightly lift the veil over the secret of the institution which he heads.

[Guzhvoy] For more than 30 years now, the collective at the institute has been involved with the development of special radio navigation systems, which allow aircraft, ships at sea, and land transportation assets to determine their precise location in space. In recent years, an entire network of long-range navigation ground stations, called "Chayka", was created with our direct participation. There are 15 ground stations altogether, each has an operational radius of up to 2-2.5 thousand kilometers.

Until quite recently these facilities were exclusively for military purposes, and that is why it was unacceptable to discuss our institute in detail. Now these ground stations, and more precisely, the radio navigation networks, formed by them, are used by civilian aircraft and ships. The signals emitted by the "Chayka" system are simply required by aviators and sailors in order to determine their coordinates in near earth space. This prevents collisions and other catastrophes. And there is one more thing I would like to talk about in particular. Our collective is actively participating in the development of a joint Soviet-American radio navigation network in the Far East.

[Davidyants] Yuriy Grigoryevich, I think it is necessary to explain to the readers, what exactly a radio navigation network is and why one is being created in the Far East.

[Guzhvoy] In order to determine coordinates, it is necessary to have a minimum of three stations which are separated from each other by a considerable distance. And such systems are called networks. And now a little bit about why we decided to cooperate with the Americans. As is generally known, there are still many regions on the Earth's surface that do not have stable radio

navigation fields. These include an enormous expanse of the northern part of the Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea. Not wishing to take a risk, aircraft and ships are forced to make a big detour around this area. As a result, unnecessary time and fuel is wasted.

Moreover, after finding one's self in distress there, people will not even be able to report their coordinates precisely. That is why the USSR and USA decided to eliminate through joint efforts the "dead" zone, which exists in the Far East today and whose total area is more than 4.5 million square kilometers. An intergovernmental agreement, which provides for using not new, but already operational Soviet radio navigation network stations in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy and in Aleksandrovsk-Sakhalinskiy and a USA coastal defense station on Attu Island (Alaska), was signed between our countries. Thus, the implementation of the project will not require any kind of special expenditures.

[Davidyants] And what specifically is the role of LNIRTI in implementing the project?

[Guzhvoy] The principal task assigned to the institute is the modernization of the radio transmitters at our stations. The fact is that the Soviet "Chayka" type navigation stations and the American "Loran-S" type navigation stations operate on the same frequency, however a number of these stations' parameters are different and we must make them conform to the international standard. Then we must achieve synchronization in the operation of all three stations, which have been put into operation in a joint Soviet-American network. Its experimental operation will begin next year, and its permanent operation in 1992.

The employees at the institute also have other peaceful goals. They are engaged in the development of highly stable quantum standards of frequency and timekeeping, which are the "heart" of various synchronization systems. There are also plans for the future, which entail a line of work that is totally new to the institute.

We are referring to the use of quantum radio electronics in the development of state-of-the-art medical devices, which our health care profession so direly needs. Such devices as tomographic equipment and diagnostic apparatuses for diagnosing AIDS (SPID), cancer, and other diseases.

**Naval Construction Halted at Nikolayev Facility**  
*90SV0065C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian  
*15 Sep 90 First Edition p 6*

[TASS report filed by A. Kuznetsov, Ukrinform correspondent: "A Shipyard Is Dismantled"]

[Text] The construction of warships at the 61st Communar plant in Nikolayev came to an end with the ceremonial launching of the "Admiral Flota Lobov" guided missile cruiser. By contract with one of the

Western firms, construction of comfortable floating hotels has begun in the vacated building slips.

One of the oldest shipyards in the republic, built two hundred years ago to supply the Russian fleet with warships, had recently been filling orders from the merchant marine for the construction of large refrigerated transports. Taking advantage of the independence that was granted, the shipyard's workers managed to solve a complicated set of organizational and technical problems caused by the transition to new production. In order to successfully interact with their foreign partners, Soviet shipbuilders have studied management in Moscow and Bologna, and have familiarized themselves with the organization of production and technology at shipyards in Italy and Denmark.

The first floating hotel with accommodations for 450 will be launched by the end of the year.

#### Loss of Workers from Defense Industries

*91UM0049A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian, 17 Oct 90 First Edition p 2*

[Article by V. Glushchenko, candidate of technical sciences, member of the initiative group: "We and the Economy. An Idea!"; "We are Proposing a 'Conversion' Association"]

[Text] It is no secret to anyone that enterprises, scientific research organizations, and design bureaus of defense industry branches are in an extremely difficult position due to cutbacks in production and the shift to conversion and to market interrelationships. Not having received their usual and large government orders, they do not know if they will be able to earn enough to pay for their everyday needs.

This year alone, nearly a half million persons will leave the defense industry branches. Of those who remain, many will have to retrain because of production conversion. This is probably the most difficult: there is no experience, no resources, and no laws. On top of all this, up to this time the technology for converting science-intensive production, organizational structures, and material incentives have not been worked out.

At the same time it is evident that all these problems will not be resolved within the framework of traditional administrative approaches by government agencies alone. It is necessary to have more flexible socio-governmental and social organizations capable of utilizing more fully the existing scientific and technical potential and the creative initiative that people have.

One possible form could be, as an example, a self-sufficient association of enterprises, organizations, and institutions of the defense complex. Our initiative group is proposing to establish just exactly this kind of association, for the time being to be called "Konversiya."

Combining the efforts and resources of its participants, the association could speed up the resolution of theoretical and practical problems of conversion by creating highly qualified councils of experts, temporary creative work collectives, and data banks. It could facilitate various kinds of intermediary services, develop centers for retraining and raising the qualifications of specialists who are in demand, and assist in implementing social programs.

Generally, an association would have access to various kinds of activities that are not, of course, forbidden either by the laws of the USSR or the union republics. The benefits of this resource, as we see it, would be to significantly decrease the negative social consequences resulting from the shift of the defense complex to market interrelationships and conversion.

We invite all those interested in our proposal to attend the regular meeting of our initiative group on October 31st in the House of Culture of the Moscow Aviation Institute.

#### Disadvantages of Civilian Freight by Military Aircraft

*91UM0049B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 17 Oct 90 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Colonel A. Andryushkov, correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "For Whom, Then, Is This Profitable?"]

[Text] In Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka there is an abundance of fresh vegetables and fruits the year around. At the marketplace. And although this past summer was unusually hot, apples and pears do not ripen here, and the marketplace price, also the year around, is firm: 15 rubles per kilogram. And at the beginning of July a bucket of potatoes cost 20-25 rubles. In military dining halls of units spread around the peninsula, by the way, as well as in communal dining rooms, the smell of the potatoes had vanished as early as the middle of March. Soldiers and civilians are forced to be satisfied with grain and macaroni. This is why the Kamchatka garrisons find out about the arrival of the "green" flights even before the aircraft take off from the airports where they are loaded.

But not all of them reach the peninsula in time. They circle around the Far East in search of a temporary landing place at intermediate airports, sometimes waiting for a long time for "good things" for Kamchatka. Military transport aircraft are "helped" in their forced idleness not only by the disorganization in the air transport system, but also by cooperatives which also charter military aircraft for their needs. Here is a picture that I had occasion to observe.

Flight Number 76580 arrived at Kamchatka with fruits and vegetables purchased from the VTA by the "Progress" cooperative. It took several days to unload the IL-76md, during which time for ten days, from the

20th to the 29th of July, the plane occupied an airport loading spot. They were waiting for "Progress" to load the plane. How could this happen? Sasha (whose family name does not need to be publicized), an authority on cooperative business matters, explains:

"It is more profitable for us to charter military rather than civilian aircraft. We pay only for the fuel, whereas the MGA demands payment for the airport loading spot and for all other services. Why do we take our time in unloading?" Sasha carelessly touched the edge of his shirt pocket where large amounts of paper currency were rustling. "So that we don't make the market prices go down..."

Yes, the workers of cooperatives know the value of money and, in fact, the value of time, too. According to the same Sasha, he and many of his colleagues sleep 4-5 hours a night. They have to hurry. A year or two will pass and perhaps the military aviators will learn all too well

how to conduct business deals. But for now, time is on the side of the hard-boiled fellows from the cooperatives.

The air regiment where Major S. Trushevich works earned 577 thousand rubles last year. Only ...

"Most of that money, 403,900 rubles," says Captain G. Faznev, Chief of the Finance Section, "was turned in as revenue for the union budget. Ten percent of the remainder goes to the aviators as their share. At the end of the year everyone has the right to receive a sum equal to twice his salary."

"By no means," said Major Trushevich, "did everyone here who directly participated in transporting economic goods receive it. Frankly, aircrews are not very interested in taking "green" flights..."

The question is: For whom, then, are they profitable today?